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PATTERNS OF A LIFE IN LAW: A CONSIDERA-
TION OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LEGAL BIOGRAPHY
Donald H.J. Hermann*
Aside from their interesting literary aspects, biographies and autobiog-
raphies afford the reader the opportunity to observe another's life and to
realize the impact of that life on history. In this Article Professor
Hermann examines some of the significant experiences of judges, legal
academicians and practicing attorneys, as related in contemporary legal
biography, and suggests that by coming to know these and other individuals
who have worked in the law, a lawyer or law student will be better able
to make meaningful decisions about his career and about himself.
INTRODUCTION
EGAL biography has been a staple of American literature since
the nineteenth century,' yet seldom do law students turn their
attention to such works and seldom do lawyers look to the
biographies of their brethren for anything more than entertainment or
for the satisfaction of idle curiosity.' While it would certainly be a
* Professor of Law and Director of Academic Planning and Inter-Disciplinary
Study, DePaul University. A.B., Stanford University; J.D., Columbia University
School of Law; L.L.M., Harvard University.
1. A few significant legal biographies which have obtained wide circulation in-
clude: A. BEVERIDGE, 1-4 THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916-1919); M.D. HowE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1957); A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S
LIFE (1946). Probably one of the most widely read legal biographies has been C.D.
BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY (1944). See
J. MARKE, DEANS' LIST OF RECOMMENDED READING FOR PRE-LAW AND LAW STUDENTS
26-53 (1958) [hereinafter cited as MARKE], for an extensive list of legal biography
up to 1958. See generally LAW BOOKS RECOMMENDED FOR LiBRARIEs (Assoc. of
Amer. Law Schools No. 7, Docket Series Vol. II, 1969). This volume contains bibli-
ographical information on American biographies from the eighteenth century on. It
was collected by J. Myron Jacobstein of Stanford University and Morris L. Cohen
of Harvard.
2. See MARKE, supra note 1, at 26, citing former Dean Mulligan of Fordham
University who argued a preference for biography as a source of information and
inspiration about a life in law:
Actually, better than any of these [other books recommended] I would
think, is a good biography of eminent American jurists such as Marshall,
Cardozo, Brandeis, or American lawyers such as Abraham Lincoln. I think
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
mistake to look at legal biographies as some sort of hagiography,'
there is much to be said for examining the lives of other persons who
share one's life's work in order to gain a better understanding
of the significance of work in the profession, and to search for in-
spiration in meeting the challenges presented in one's career. The
contribution of biography in providing role models is one which
needs stress in a time without heroes.4 The more appealing consid-
eration, however, is that biography is one resource available to the
individual who is attempting to gain a fuller understanding of his own
identity,5 or who is in the process of developing an identity. To
know others is in a great measure to know ourselves. It is the prem-
ise of this article that in reading the biographies of those involved
in law, we will come to know ourselves and find increased meaning
in our work.
This article will consider the nature of biography and the place
of legal biography in contemporary literature. The purposes that
may be achieved in reading legal biography will then be examined
that if a student can become imbued with the spirit of some of the great
men of the law, this might be more helpful in his own development than
introductory materials which are more prosaic in nature.
3. Hagiography is the biography of saints or venerated persons read for inspira-
tion. See, e.g., A. BUTLER, LIVES OF THE SAINTS (1956).
4. See generally The Vanishing American Hero, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
July 21, 1975, at 16-18. But see A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
233 (1969), where the author asserts that while there is a failure to adopt role models
there remain some heroes:
Though students today no longer find models, if they ever did, in parents,
professors or pastors, though many seek fulfillment in their personal code
of authenticity or in drugs or love, they have not abandoned heroes.
Nearly all regard John F. Kennedy with admiration and reverence. Many
in 1968 followed and then mourned his brother; many others followed Eu-
gene McCarthy ....
The disenchantment with national leaders controlling foreign policy as manifested in
the Vietnam war, the failure of the new Left following Kent State and the alienation
following the Watergate revelations and the resignation of Richard Nixon, have cre-
ated a climate which is devoid of heroes of any magnitude and has led to a period
dominated by privateness.
5. A sense of identity is crucial to stability and satisfaction in everyday life.
See, e.g., A. WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 19 (1958):
Identity is a coherent sense of self. It depends upon the awareness that
one's endeavors and one's life make sense, that they are meaningful in the
context in which life is lived. It depends also upon stable values, and upon
the conviction that one's actions and values are harmoniously related. It
is a sense of wholeness, of integration, of knowing what is right and what
is wrong and of being able to choose.
[Vol. 24:853854
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with special emphasis on the personal and professional benefits to
be obtained from such reading. Finally, a number of recently pub-
lished biographies in the broad categories of (a) jurists, (b) legal
academicians, and (c) practicing attorneys will be considered. The
emphasis here is not simply on alternative career patterns, but on
the depth of personal experience witnessed in examining the lives
of those persons being considered.
I. WHAT Is BIOGRAPHY?
Biography, according to Thomas Carlyle, is "the life of a man;"
it includes autobiography which is limited in perspective and to a
given span of the writer's life.' The biography is to be distinguished
from history, the philosophical treatise, or even a comment on con-
temporary occurrences; the biography has a "central hero" to whom
all events and other personages are subsidiary.7 In English litera-
ture, biography really came into being with William Roper's life of
Sir Thomas More and George Cavendish's memorial of Cardinal
Wolsey, both written in the sixteenth century. 8 In 1791, when
James Boswell's Life of Dr. Samuel Johnson was published, bio-
graphy as a form was fully developed, and this work is often regarded
as the model of modem biographies. 9 Although the subject of this
6. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 722 (1964). The word is derived from the
Greek bios (life) and graphein (to write).
7. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDA BRrrANNICA 636 (1968). See generally H. NICOLSON,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH BIoGRAPHY 7-16 (1928) [hereinafter cited as NIcHOL-
SON]. The author circumscribes the subject matter of biography in the following
terms:
The Oxford Dictionary defines biography as "the history of the lifes [sic]
of individual men as a branch of literature." This definition is convenient:
it insists on three essential elements--"history," "individual," and "litera-
ture;" it prescribes by implication that biography must be a truthful record
of an individual and composed as a work of art; it thus excludes narratives
which are unhistorical, which do not deal primarily with individuals, or
which are not composed with a conscious artistic purpose.
Id. at 7-8.
8. NicoLsoN, supra note 7, at 28-37. See E. JOHNSON, A TREASURY OF BIoGRA-
PHY 12-52 (1941), where portions of Roper's and Cavendish's works are reprinted
along with selections from important biographies published prior to 1950. See gen-
erally G. CARVER, ARMS FOR OBLMON: BOOKS, MEN AND BioGRAPHY (1946).
9. NICOLSON, supra note 7, at 109. Nicolson asserts, "In the formula invented
and perfected by James Boswell our national talent for biography found its full ex-
pression." For a critical view of Boswell's work which recognizes it as great litera-
ture, but less than a perfect model for modern biography, see J. GARRATY, THn NA-
1975] 855
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biography, Samuel Johnson, was both an engaging and important
literary figure, and Boswell was a clever and gifted writer, the signifi-
cance of the work lies in the fact that in form it was "autobiographi-
cal," using Johnson's conversations, letters and other documents.
This plan was pursued in a terse writing style with strict adherence
to "facts" as they were perceived by the author. Boswell attempted
to determine the effect of circumstances on his subject by viewing
his subject from various perspectives and emphasizing his growth and
movement through life.
By the nineteenth century, biographies became superabundant.
Their quality was uneven so that in literary terms one must conclude,
just as now, that there were few meritorious works of this nature
which appeared as a matter of course. 10 Nonetheless, it remains
true, that in the mass of biographies that regularly appear one can
find lives interesting to examine both for the experience of that life
and for the impact of that life on history.
It is perhaps in the portrayal of particular life experiences that the
essence of biography can be found; an essence which is also its chief
significance. One commentator on biography has captured this
aspect of the art.
[T]he distinction between recreating and commenting on a life is not so
easy to respect. And the distinction is one that must be dealt with at the
most critical moments in the life, the moments of decision, the moment
when career takes a turn or love takes a wife, the moment when character is
simultaneously illustrated and reshaped by a choice of action or attitude.
TURE OF BIOGRAPHY 25-26 (1957).
Even Boswell's Johnson, certainly the most universally admired biography
in any language, suffers from grave faults when judged as a biography. Bos-
well has been justly praised for his brilliant use of anecdote and conversa-
tion, for his subtle synthesis of materials, and for his masterly presentation
of character. But his book is all out of proportion, with its heavy emphasis
on the last years of Johnson's life, and it is dependent for that period chiefly
on the observations of one man, the author. Where Boswell was forced to
make use of sources other than his own keen eye and acute ear for dialogue,
his book is hardly more than pedestrian in quality. It may be the world's
best biography, but it is not a model biography.
See also R. ALTICK, LIVES AND LETrERS: A HISTORY OF LITERARY BIooRAPHY IN ENG-
LAND AND AMERICA 58-74 (1965).
10. This is true of legal biography also, for instance 1-4 0. PICKERINO, THE LIFE
OF THOMAS PICKERING (1867-73); W. JAY, THE LIFE OF JOHN JAY (1833); W.
MEIGs, THE LIFE OF CHARLES JARED INGERSOLL (1897). Quite often, as in the
above, the authors were close relatives of the subject, and the works are characterized
by an adulation which converts them to memorials rather than maintaining that ob-
jectivity which characterized Boswell's work.
[Vol. 24:853
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These are the moments, sometimes not simple to detect, which mark the
true stages of existence, the determining and determinate climaxes summing
up the past and giving birth to the future, the moments when, as Carlyle
pointed out, a man [and his biographer] discovers what he is in what he
does."
This focus on decisions calls for a choice among "the welter of psy-
chological-physical happenings" in order to identify matters crucial
to the personal decision.' 2 Biography then, by nature, is limited not
only to an abstraction of history, but an abstraction of an individual
life. Thus biography can never inform us of the total personality
of the subject but it can tell us much about the decision-making
process, the criteria invoked as legitimatization, and the effects of
these decisions.
Autobiography is a special form of biography; it is "life-writing"
in that it is written by the person whose life is its subject." Though
it has been suggested that autobiography is limited by the fact that
the writer has a restricted perspective of his life,' 4 it is, nonetheless,
true that a perceptive autobiographer is often capable of delving
below the conscious, or is at least able to give clues to subconscious
attitudes and beliefs which permit the discriminating reader to obtain
a fuller understanding of the emotions of the person under scrutiny. 1
So while it has been asserted that "[t]he autobiographer, in sum
knows more but tells less, on the whole, than the biographer,"'" the
autobiographer reveals more and the reader may discover more.
A tension has developed in modern biography between the claim
of the social sciences to biography as part of historical and psycho-
logical studies' 7 and the maintenance of biography as a literary
form.'" To this tension is added efforts at writing biography accord-
11. P. KENDALL, THE ART OF BIOGRAPHY 27 (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEN-
DALL].
12. Id. at 27-28.
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 30.
15. See generally S. FREuD, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE (1930).
16. KENDALL, supra note 11, at 30.
17. See, e.g., A. TAYLOR, BISMARK (1955), a social science style biography joining
the historical and psychological approaches; E. EmiKsON, GANDI'S TRUTH (1969),
a psychoanalytical biography which by its nature must be highly speculative; B.
BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHENSON (1974), an historical biography rest-
ing on a detailed documentary foundation.
18. See, e.g., L. STRACHEY, EMINENT VICTORIANS (1918).
1975]
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ing to a journalistic form.19 This tension caused Sir Harold Nicolson
to lament at the conclusion of his lectures on biography that the
"scientific interest in biography is hostile to, and it will in the end
prove destructive of, the literary interest" 20 since a scientific ap-
proach insists on an account of all the facts of the life scrutinized.
A literary approach, however, is satisfied with a partial or artificial
representation of facts: "The scientific interest, as it developes, will
become insatiable; no synthetic power, no genius for representation,
will be able to keep the pace . . . . [t]he more that biography be-
comes a branch of science the less will it become a branch of litera-
ture."'" While for Nicolson, biography will retain its integrity only
so long as it maintains the characteristics of "truth, individuality and
art,"22 he correctly recognized that biography of any quality must be
valued for its effect of "conveying human experience."23
It is true, however, that even contemporary reviewers of biography
demand the literary element to be present rather than accepting a
simple record of facts. This point can be observed in the recent
remarks of one judge of biography for the National Book Awards.
My own belief is that a biographer should aim for a combination of truth,
dispassion and sympathy-a combination that is not, I would argue, unat-
tainable. When it is attained, one passes from bias to point of view, with-
out which a biography, unless it is printed out by a computer, can hardly
be said to exist.2 4
As for autobiography, this same critic observed:
[It] is, I suspect, even more difficult to write than biography. It is not
that sympathy is wanting. In a typical autobiography, there is a generous
supply of that for the beloved object under scrutiny; but dispassion and ob-
jectivity are all too often in short supply.25
In both biography and autobiography, it is a life which is under
scrutiny. By observing selected occurrences, decisions and relation-
ships, we come to know another person as revealed in the by-
products of life and as interpreted by the author or through the self-
19. See, e.g., M. KALB & B. KALB, KISSINGER (1974).
20. NIcOLSON, supra note 7, at 154.
21. Id. at 154-55.
22. Id. at 157.
23. Id. at 158.
24. Stansky, Thinking about Biography, 172, TAB NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 1975.
at 25.
25. Id.
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revelation of the subject. The style of the writing or the mood of
the author will crucially affect our understanding, but the central
chore of the work is to communicate an understanding of the life
of another person, and it is this potential for understanding which
makes a biography so valuable for the modem reader. By observing
the life of the subject we can develop critical standards for a style
and the decisions of life, and can come to a basis for evaluating and
leading our own life.
II. THE VALUE OF LEGAL BIOGRAPHY TO THE
PERSON TRAINED IN LAW
Legal biography, as a somewhat arbitrary classification, has been
developed for the purposes of this article, and includes writings about
and by persons trained in law and pursuing careers in law. The
question being addressed here is why persons studying law or pur-
suing a career in law should read about the lives of other persons
similarly situated.
Dean Thomas Shaffer of the Notre Dame Law School has
suggested a disquieting result of the study of problems of profes-
sional responsibility: that to come to know lawyers as they appear
to pursue their careers "is not to love them" and that to consider
a lawyer's life with his clients "is not necessarily to look forward to
it." Shaffer concludes that "[t]hese are ominous thoughts which
center in a conflict between role and identity."'26 This conflict
follows from an inconsistency in the internally held system of values
and the conduct observed in the practice of law by the bar, or as
a result of the criticism of lawyers by the public.27 One commonly
26. Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
721, 731 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Shaffer]. Shaffer suggests a process by which
role and identity become clarified, and the conflict between them becomes apparent:
If I close my eyes and imagine a lawyer, I expose myself to a role. If I
close my eyes and see me, I expose myself to an identity. And if I close
my eyes and see myself as a lawyer, I expose myself to the conflict between
my role and my identity. The role concept is sociological-seen from the
outside in; the identity concept is psychological-seen from the inside out.
Id.
27. See J. CAVANAUGH, THE LAWYER IN SOCIETY 66-67 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as CAVANAUGH], noting quotations from literature as evidence of the low esteem in
which lawyers are held.
Attorneys and rogues are vermin not easily rooted out of a rich soil.
Walpole, Letter to Sir Horace Mann
Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
1975] 859
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accepted solution to this conflict is a separation of private life from
career role resulting in a certain kind of schizophrenia, i.e., the
person passes through various roles, acting them out according to
perceived expectations, but remaining personally remote from actual
involvement. In a sense the person is an observer of his own
activity.
The gravest danger in this solution is the loss of personal identity.
The psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton of Yale University has denomi-
nated this condition as "Protean Man" and describes the condition
as a style of self-process "characterized by an interminable series of
experiments and explorations, some shallow, some profound, each
of which can readily be abandoned in favor of still new, psychological
quests. '28  Lifton provides a graphic example of his concept of
"protean style" in a report of an interview with one of his patients,
a teacher, who admitted to assuming the "mask" of a number of roles
in his life.
He asked the question, "Is there, or should there be, one face which should
be authentic?". . . . He went on to compare himself to an actor on the
stage, who, as he put it, "performs with a certain kind of polymorphous ver-
satility," and here he was of course referring, somewhat mockingly, to
Freud's well-known phrase "polymorphous perversity" for the diffusely in-
clusive and, in a way also Protean, infantile sexuality. And he went on
to ask: "Which is the real person, so far as an actor is concerned? Is he
more real when performing on the stage, or when he is at home? I tend
then to think that for people who have these many, many masks, there
is no home. Is it a futile gesture for the actor to try to find his real
face?"
29
A lawyer is faced with the possibility of the protean condition
when he adopts the "mouthpiece" syndrome30 and submerges his en-
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?
Sandburg, The Lawyer Knows Too Much
I would be loath to speak ill of any person who I do not know deserves
it, but I am afraid he is an attorney.
Samuel Johnson (Mrs. Piazzi, Johnsoniana)
28. R. LiFTON, BOUNDARIES: PSYCHOLOGICAL MAN IN REVOLUTION 44 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as LFrON].
29. Id. at 45.
30. CAVANAuwH, supra note 27, at 36, where the "mouthpiece" syndrome is de-
scribed:
"Mouthpiece" is the word sometimes used to describe the lawyer in his
capacity as advocate. As in his role as social engineer, he here takes as
his own the direction and goal supplied by his client. But while engineering
860
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tire personality into the pursuit of his clients' goals. This was the
tragic flaw of some lawyers who served the Nixon White House."
While the lawyer's calling requires service to the client, that calling
is perverted when it is pursued in violation of one's sense of personal
ideals, when role is chosen at the sacrifice of identity. 2
On the other hand, there is a danger that in avoiding the possibility
of conflict between role and identity, the individual will seek to
maintain a rigid personality without the ability to adapt to the needs
of others or to accomodate to social or historical changes. Lifton
describes this personality type as "one dimensional" and regards it
as a defense to the challenge presented by role.
[O]ne can observe in contemporary man a tendency which seems to be pre-
cisely the opposite of the Protean style. . . . I refer here to the closing
off of identity, the constriction of self-process, to a straight-and-narrow spe-
cialization in psychological as well as in intellectual life, and to reluctance
to let in any extraneous influence. This kind of "one-dimensional" self-
process, however, I would see as having an essentially reactive or compensa-
tory quality. In this it differs from earlier characterilogical styles it may
seem to resemble, such as Riesman's inner-directed man, and still earlier
patterns in traditional society. For these were direct outgrowths of socie-
ties which then existed, and were therefore in harmony with those socie-
the client's purpose requires only the use of the lawyer's technical compe-
tence, advocating that purpose requires the use of the lawyer's skill . . . in
eliciting emotional as well as intellectual response. To lend these very per-
sonal traits, which are usually natural gifts, not acquired, to another's pur-
poses and goals seems to many to be a prostitution of the personality.
Hence comes the derogatory term "mouthpiece."
See generally Hermann, The Brave New Breed Revisited, 24 WASH. ST. B.J. 38
(1970).
31. See generally Watson, The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational
Deficiency Disease, 26 J. LEGAL ED. 441, 445-47 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The
Watergate Lawyer Syndrome].
32. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974).
Through an empirical study of the relationship between lawyers and clients in per-
sonal injury cases, the author concludes that the "participatory" role of the client is
superior to the "traditional" role of professional dominance. Yet, the author does
not maintain that this "participatory" relationship inevitably leads to the "mouth-
piece" syndrome. Choices are still available.
Under the [traditional model], if the lawyer honestly believes that it is in
the long-term interests of the client not to get custody of the child, by what-
ever criteria of interest the lawyer deems appropriate, he is justified in seek-
ing to deny that custody regardless of the client's desires. Under the parti-
cipatory model, the lawyer may not act contrary to the desires of the client,
without assuming liability for negligence or even for an intentional tort.
. . . [He] has three choices: to persuade the parent to surrender custody,
vigorously to seek custody of the child for the client in spite of his mis-
givings, or to withdraw from the case.
Id. at 177.
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ties, while the constricted self-process . . . requires continuous psychologi-
cal work to fend off Protean influences which are always abroad. 33
The integrity of the individual, which comprises one's identity, can
accommodate the requirements of roles and meet the exigencies of
new and various situations only if there is confidence in the sense
of self and a sensitivity to the needs of others. This calls for a bal-
ance which has been described by Andrew Watson of Michigan Law
School as a "high sensitivity to self joined with great sophistication
about the technical obligations and procedures of the legal profes-
sion." 34 It is important, however, to understand that the accommoda-
tion of one's sense of identity does not require a surrender to role, 5
and it is the observation of this ability which can be observed in the
lives of persons worthy of admiration, who have chosen to live a life
in law.
While much of what has been said about the relationship between
identity and role, and by implication the relevance of biography as
a resource in resolving this conflict, appears to be aimed at the
adolescent or young adult, there is, however, a continuing relevance
to persons whose lives are lived with integrity. Throughout life, the
individual has a series of conflicts which, as they are resolved, will
have a crucial effect on the personality. The psychoanalyst Eric
Erikson has focused much attention on the development of identity
in the earlier stages of life, including accommodation to trust, auton-
omy and initiative, but he has as strongly maintained that the content
of personal identity must reflect the resolution of the conflicts
between intimacy and self-absorption, between generativity and
stagnation, and between integrity and despair.36 These latter con-
33. LIFrON, supra note 28, at 51-52.
34. The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome, supra note 31, at 441.
35. See E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 368, n.1 (1950). Erikson describes
this accommodation:
The concept of ego identity may be misunderstood in two ways. One mis-
conception would be that a sense of identity is achieved primarily through
the individual's complete surrender to given social roles and through his in-
definite adaptation to the demands of social change. This, of course, would
mean a fixation on an adolescent solution. No ego, it is true, can develop
outside of social processes which offer workable prototypes and roles. The
healthy and strong individual, however, adapts these roles to the further
processes of his ego, thus doing his share in keeping the social process alive.
36. Erikson, Growth and Crisis of the "Healthy Personality" in C. KLUCKHOHN,
& Assoc., PERSONALrrY IN NATURE, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE 185 (1955), reprinted in
[Vol. 24:853
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flicts are encountered throughout adulthood and the witness of those
who have successfully coped with these conflicts can be a source of
wisdom for those proceeding through life. Erikson designates a
successful life as one lived with "integrity," which he characterizes
as the resolution of the conflict of identity and role.37
As Dean Shaffer has suggested, personal identity is broader in
scope than one's professional role; it is "broader and deeper than
his sense of himself as a lawyer. ' 38  Yet the problem of identifying
the contours of expected role, of locating role models, is difficult
and it is here that biography is particularly helpful.3 9  While one
must continue to test the demands or expectations of role against
J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 334
(1967). Erikson describes a prescription appropriate to the individual who finds
himself in a professional role.
Freud was once asked what he thought a normal person should be able to
do well. The questioner probably expected a complicated, a "deep" answer.
But Freud is reported to have said, "Lieben und arbeiten" (to love and to
work). It pays to ponder on this simple formula, it gets deeper as you
think about it. For when Freud said "Love," he meant the expansiveness
of generosity as well as genital love; when he said love and work, he meant
a general productiveness which would not preoccupy the individual to the
extent that his right or capacity to be a sexual and a loving being would
be lost. Thus we may ponder but we cannot improve on the formula, which
includes the doctor's prescription for human dignity-and for democratic
living.
Id. at 349.
37. Id.
Only he who in some way has taken care of things and people and has
adapted himself to the triumphs and disappointments adherent to being, by
necessity, the originator of others and the generator of things and ideas-
only he may gradually grow the fruit of the seven stages [of personality
development], I know no better word for it than integrity. . . . It is the
acceptance of one's own and only life cycle and of the people who have
become significant to it as something that had to be and that, by necessity,
permitted of no substitutions.
38. Shaffer, supra note 26, at 735.
39. Dean Shaffer points out the great difficulty for the law student in finding role
models for the conventional practice of law.
It is generally true that many students come to law school without know-
ing well even one lawyer, and many young lawyers enter the practice with-
out knowing well any lawyers but their law school teachers. Both facts
were true in my case. Idealized visions of Webster, Darrow, John W.
Davis, and Brandeis are remote. Judges are of questionable value as models
for law students because most of us do not think of ourselves as judges, or
if we do, we are, because of it, poorer lawyers. Although professors inevit-
ably are models for professional conduct, they are often inadequate in this
regard because they are not in professional practice. ...
Shaffer, supra note 26, at 735-36.
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a personal sense of self, it is clear, as Shaffer points out, that refer-
ence to the lives of others is an important source of information.
In considering the insights of modem psychological theory for the
resolution of the conflict of identity and role, Shaffer enumerates
both needs and resources. The needs include: an understanding
of one's own feelings since "much of learning how to be a lawyer
is learning how to be oneself";40 and a knowledge about people. As
for resources, "one's best resource for learning about people is him-
self," however, "one's next best resource for learning about people,
and thus for learning about himself, is other people."' 41  The lives
of others as rendered in biography are, moreover, one important
resource for learning about other people.
The value of such reading is increased as more of the total person
is observed coping with the problems of life and agonizing over what
are perceived to be crucial decisions. It is this union of the intellec-
tual and the emotional which is observed in another's life, and which
is so often ignored in legal study and professional discussions, that
is central to the living of a life in law.42  Andrew Watson has
observed that the English bar involves the practitioner in intimate
contact with others similarly situated so that sociological conditions
facilitate a transmission of ideal standards of behavior and profes-
sional responsibility. These standards are communicated in highly
effective ways and maintenance of a high level of professional
behavior "does not need to rely quite so much on internalized psy-
chological controls and imagery. '' 43 Of course, the experience of the
Inns is not available to the American lawyer, nor is the practice con-
ducted with the same sense of professional community so that "the
development of internalized value systems and controls" becomes of
paramount importance.44 It is this sense of idealistic professional
behavior in performance of role which Watson properly suggests is
crucial to a satisfying pursuit of a career in law.
Professionalism in the last analysis is related to idealistic behavior, and a
40. Id. at 741.
41. Id.
42. See generally Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological
Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CN. L. REV. 91 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
The Quest for Professional Competence].
43. Id. at 156.
44. Id. at 157.
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failure to make this kind of identification must categorically be viewed as
a serious academic omission. I believe that successful legal education must
pay conscious and continuous attention to such problems of idealism, and
the psychological dynamics of developing a professional attitude must be
comprehended and fully utilized. 45
Watson is quite explicit in the value of "heroes" whose behavior
and careers can serve as standards for professional behavior.
Law schools must provide students with "heroes for emulation" . . . I am
suggesting straightforward hero worship with the deliberate provision of
heroes. The ultimate purpose . . . is to supply students with a variety of
desirable models after which they can pattern their professional career. 40
Considering the possible source of such heroes and role models,
Watson suggests that a valuable resource is to be found in world liter-
ature including novels and biography. He observes that "[t]hese
books minutely describe the behavior of lawyers in various modes
of their operation. They are not only interesting to read as
literature, but they provide superb material on professional behavior
",47
Watson has lately observed a fact that makes heroes and models
relevant to the mature lawyer; this is the fact that much of the
lawyer's work goes on in private shrouded by the attorney-client priv-
ilege. This means the activity is never held up to public scrutiny
and there is no occasion for public acclaim.4 8  Thus as Watson
observes: "Counsel's gratification about handling these difficult
45. Id. at 127.
46. Id. at 158. The development of standards of "idealistic behavior" makes the
search for heroes a significant personal endeavor. The hero is a necessary cultural
phenomena, and while this seems to be a time without heroes, a culture cannot long
survive without them. A personal sense of idealism probably cannot be maintained
without the reference point provided by the hero. See R. ANGELL, FREE SOCIETY
AND MORAL CRisis 28 (1965):
In the folklore of primitive peoples and the sagas of peoples taking their
first step toward civilization the symbols of common values are folk heroes;
in the literature of highly developed societies, they are historic figures. The
United States has a distinguished gallery of these, three of whom are of
giant stature: Washington with his dignity and steadfastness, Jefferson with
his belief in the common man, and Lincoln with his human compassion.
There is no need to spell out the role such heroes play in keeping common
values fresh and in projecting them, by force of subtle suggestion, into ac-
tion. Who can say how many Americans have not been inspired in their
daily lives by the examples of these great men?
47. The Quest for Professional Competence, supra note 42, at 158-59.
48. The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome, supra note 31, at 444. See also Hermann,
Book Review, 1972 Wis. L. Rlv. 634, 660.
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problems skillfully must come almost completely from within himself
in the form of self-knowledge and self-satisfaction."49  This of
course requires a sense of integrity, and this sense of integrity comes
in part from "the presence of good examples of how to do it."50
Many good examples of how to live a life in law with integrity, which
in turn gives rise to a sense of self-satisfaction, can be found in the
lives of lawyers as recounted in biography.
The remainder of this article will examine a number of recent biog-
raphies of persons engaged in legal careers. The emphasis will be
placed on the type of insights which can be gained from this genre
of literature; insights which can give guidance and meaning to per-
sons about to be or already engaged in legal careers.
III. A SURVEY OF RECENT LEGAL BIOGRAPHY
A. BIOGRAPHIES OF JURISTS
John Marshall
It is more than half a century since Albert J. Beveridge published
his four volume comprehensive biography, The Life of John Mar-
shall."' While that work has weathered the years quite well, it may
be superseded by the impressive biography Leonard Baker has
written, John Marshall: A Life in Law,"' a four part work which
49. The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome, supra note 31, at 444.
50. Id. at 444-45:
This ability to carry out self regulation and self criticism, and self pay-off,
takes a great deal of guided experience to learn and build into one's psycho-
logical functioning. Failure to emphasize and reinforce this kind of satis-
faction ...will greatly increase the incidence of unethical and unprofes-
sional behavior by lawyers ...
51. A. BEVERIDGE, 1-4 THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916-1919). The succeed-
ing period has seen a number of commentaries which attempt to fix Marshall's contri-
bution to our constitutional legal system, but no significant effort has been made to
give a full account of his life. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CON-
STITUTION (1919); B. PALMER, MARSHALL AND TANEY: STATESMEN OF THE LAW
(1939); D. LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE RE-
PUBLIC (1949); CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL (W. Jones ed.
1956); S. KONEFSKY, JOHN MARSHALL AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON: ARCHI-
TECTS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1964); R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF JOHN MARSHALL (1968); R. NEWMEYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL
AND TANEY (1969); D. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON (1970); JOHN MAR-
SHALL (S. Kutler ed. 1972). A well written biography for the younger reader is pro-
vided in T. MARTINI, JOHN MARSHALL (1974).
52. L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW (1974) [hereinafter cited as
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is concerned with Marshall's four adult professional roles: soldier,
lawyer, diplomat and judge.
Chief Justice John Marshall presided over the United States
Supreme Court for almost three and one-half decades during the
formative period of our constitutional law. Marshall championed
judicial supremacy, 53 judicial review of legislative action," the
primacy of federalism 5 and the inviolability of contracts. 6 In a
great measure, Marshall's judicial contributions to American history
are a product of his life, especially his development of a sense of
independence and a devotion to law. Baker states this proposition
as the theme of his book: "The story of John Marshall is the story
of one man's devotion to law and his efforts to persuade his country
of the wisdom of such devotion. '5 7
Marshall, the son of a Virginia landowner, was a bright child and
a good student. His background and early associations developed
in him a dedication to a system of property ownership and an
acceptance of slavery. At nineteen, as a lieutenant in the Virginia
Militia, he served four years doing valiant service at the battles of
Great Bridge, Valley Forge, and Monmouth. Success as a soldier
and a friendship with Washington brought Marshall decorations and
some renown. Baker argues that Marshall's later success follows
from these early years when the forces of the frontier provided him
with good health, self-reliance, friendship, and the influence of edu-
cational discipline. Baker also reports that this frontier experience
impressed on Marshall the necessity of a legal system.
It was, however, his educational experience which destined
Marshall to excel in relationship to his father and his contemporaries.
BAKER]. See Stephenson, Book Review, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 959 (1975) where the
author makes several interesting comparisons between the biographies written by
Beveridge and Baker. "While Beveridge's work consisted of four volumes, Baker's
consists of one. Yet the actual length of the two books is approximately the same;
Beveridge's consists of 449,000 words of text, Baker's has 373,000." Id. at 960-61.
The respective authors consider Marshall's life in a similar pattern. Baker, however,
emphasizes the personal aspects of Marshall's life in contrast to Beveridge's emphasis
on his legal and political activities in their social context.
53. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
54. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
55. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
56. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
57. BAKER, supra note 52, at ix.
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His formal legal education consisted of a few months at The College
of William and Mary, the customary length of time in that era.
During that short period, Marshall showed a singleminded diligence
in his studies.
Prior to and following his studies, Marshall courted Polly Amber,
whose companionship would serve him well throughout his life. His
career was assisted greatly by the couple's connections: her father
was a Richmond alderman and a state treasurer; his father, who had
established the family wealth, became prominent in Kentucky gov-
ernment serving as an agent for George Washington at the frontier
and thus keeping his son's name in prominence before national
authorities.
In 1780, young Marshall presented himself at the Fauquier
County courthouse with a license signed by Thomas Jefferson and
proceeded rapidly to establish himself as an effective member of the
Richmond bar. Although he was often dismissed by clients on first
impression as unsophisticated and of eccentric or unkempt dress, his
appearance was deceptive because he was not only an effective
lawyer but was quickly becoming an enterprising land speculator.
By the mid-1780's John Marshall had developed a specialty in
appellate advocacy, although he was not considered a great orator.
"His style was said to be simple and clear and he possessed 'a quick-
ness of perception that enabled him at once to lay hold on the strong
points of his own cause and the weak ones of his adversaries.'
Attitudes which he developed in his youth, and later experiences
which reinforced these attitudes, can be observed in Marshall's
career .5  For instance, his dedication to an independent judiciary
stemmed in part from his belief that one cause of the American Rev-
olution had been King George M's arbitrary treatment of judges. In
1783 as a member of the Privy Council, Marshall heard a petition
from the governor to have a magistrate removed for "diverse gross
misdemeanors, disgraceful to the character which should be pre-
served by a justice of the peace."60 While the law permitted obtain-
ing advisory opinions on the conduct of magistrates, Marshall joined
58. Id. at 87.
59. See generally BAKER, supra note 52, at 90-92.
60. Id. at 90.
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in an opinion recommending against executive exercise of any direct
control over the judiciary. Such control, despite any legal capacity
of the executive, was "contrary to the fundamental principles of our
constitution and directly opposite to the general tenor of our laws,"
judges should be tried for illegal conduct and not subject to vague
discretionary action of the executive."'
Marshall evidenced a strict conformity to the requirements of his
role and office while remaining sensitive to the problems of others
and of the community. In his first judicial position, equivalent to
justice of the peace, assumed in 1785 and the only judicial office
he held before moving to the Supreme Court, Marshall was pre-
sented with a petition for clemency. The case involved a free black
woman who had killed an assailant in her home but who was unable
to give testimony in her defense because evidence from a black
against a white was not permitted in court.02 Moreover, the woman
was raped in prison and became pregnant while under a sentence
of death. Marshall was asked to sign a petition declaring the woman
not guilty and the victim of prejudice by the venire. Marshall
refused to sign this petition because he had not heard the facts of
the case. However, upon the urging of his wife, he joined in a peti-
tion for mercy for the woman, based on the report of her good char-
acter. The woman was pardoned.
Involving himself in the life of the community, Marshall joined
veterans groups, church groups, the Masons, and various social clubs.
Baker reports extensively on Marshall's ability to relax with friends
and colleagues in his social clubs; a continual source of satisfaction
to Marshall in his professional life.
The Constitutional Convention of 1787, following growing dif-
ficulties with maintaining national unity under the Articles of Con-
federation, caught Marshall at a propitious moment in his career and
provided him a political question with which he could readily
identify: the primacy of federalism. While Marshall did not attend
the Convention, he was a strong advocate of the adoption of the Con-
stitution. Marshall, himself, recognized the significance of life's
experience in the formation of his opinion of the significance of the
Constitution.
61. Id. at 91.
62. Id. at 101.
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[Eixplaining why he supported the Constitution he attributed it "at least
as much to casual circumstances as to judgment." He had grown up, he
explained, at a time when love of country and opposition to England was
inseparable, "and I had imbibed these sentiments so thoroughly that they
constituted a part of my being." And then in the Army, he continued, he
had met men from all the states who had risked their lives in the cause
of country. His interest in the Union continued when he returned to
civilian life, particularly when he entered the legislature and discovered
"that no safe and permanent remedy could be found but in a more efficient
and better organized general government." The part of the Constitution
which imposed restriction on the states most appealed to him because he had
come to realize that without such a central power, there was "no safe
anchorage ground" and so he became a "determined advocate" for adoption
of the Constitution.63
With the adoption of the Constitution, Marshall retreated from state
politics and returned to his prosperous law practice in Richmond.
The French Revolution produced some division in America, and
the tension heightened when Washington's government signed the
Jay Treaty and cast aside the entreaties of Jefferson for a pro-French
intervention. Marshall joined the supporters of Washington and
gained a national reputation for his efforts. Baker points out the
coincidence of Marshall's interests as a wealthy landowner and the
stabilization that resulted from the treaty. It is interesting to note
that the responsibilities accompanying age and property ownership
resulted in a lessening interest in war, a topic which had captivated
Marshall's imagination at the time of the American Revolution.
As relations with the French worsened, President Adams turned
to Marshall along with Ambassador Pinckney and Elbridge Gerry to
reach a satisfactory understanding with the French. Marshall,
understandably, was reluctant to accept this or similar appointments
which might interfere with his career or his finances.
He hesitated, however-"It was the first time in my life that I had ever
hesitated concerning the acceptance of office," he recalled years later. He
felt "a very deep interest" in the French situation; he had been involved in
it actively since 1793 and he had helped create it by his vociferous defense
of George Washington. He believed John Adams sincerely wanted to ad-
just the differences with France peacefully. .... 64
It is important to note that his decision to accept the appointment
was not made out of pure sense of duty, but it was tempered by
63. Id. at 119.
64. Id. at 217-18.
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personal considerations including an assessment of the burden of the
task as well as benefits to be obtained from it.
The determining point . . . was that the appointment would be a tempo-
rary one .... .. I should return after a short absence, to my profession,
with no diminution of character, and I trusted, with no diminution of prac-
tice. . . . I could make arrangements with the gentlemen of the bar which
would prevent my business from suffering in the meantime."
Perhaps there was another factor. John Marshall was by now an educated,
even a cultivated man. . . . But never had he been to Europe. Never had
he experienced that cosmopolitan aura of Paris, and perhaps he believed it
was time to correct that oversight. Marshall accepted the appointment.65
While Marshall had no special gift of diplomatic talent, his talent as
an advocate and his sense of practical judgment enabled him to carry
out his mission successfully.
Following his return to the United States, Marshall was drafted
as a federalist congressman from Virginia. Motivated by practical
politics, he soon moved away from an extreme federalist position and
opposed the Alien and Sedition Laws, which had federalist sponsor-
ship.s Marshall demonstrated a sense of pragmatism and a care-
fully developed position which one associates with a successful
politician who must appeal to his constituency, in this case Virginia
voters hostile to the Alien and Sedition Laws, and his political party
which sponsored them.
"I am not . . . an advocate for the Alien and Sedition Bills." At a time
when his political party had made the Alien and Sedition Laws its raison
d' tre, at a time when the Alien and Sedition Laws were the major-almost
the only-political issue, those eleven words of John Marshall's required
courage. "Had I been in Congress when they passed, I should, unless my
judgment could have been changed, certainly have opposed them." Mar-
shall, however, still a Federalist, still the admirer of George Washing-
ton, could not completely disown the handiwork of Washington and his
own party. "I do not think them fraught with all those mischiefs which
many gentlemen ascribe to them," he said. His opposition, he continued,
would have been based on his belief that the bills, rather, were useless and
because they "are calculated to create unnecessary discontents and jealousies
at a time when our very existence, as a nation, may depend on our union."
He then added that if the bills when originally proposed, had been fought
on that basis by someone "not suspected of intending to destroy the govern-
ment, or being hostile to it"--meaning a prominent Federalist such as him-
self-they never would have been enacted. As for opposing them if he
were elected, Marshall said he believed the issue would be settled before
65. Id. at 218.
66. Id. at 304.
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he could take his seat. In the event of any doubts, however, he added: "I
shall indisputably oppose their revival." 6 7
As an elected official he served his constituents according to their
wishes so far as they were consistent with his convictions. However,
shortly after his election he was appointed by President Adams as
Secretary of War, and then as Secretary of State in which office he
served until his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1801.
Marshall's career was pursued in constant opposition to the
policies of Thomas Jefferson, and that opposition took on the form
of institutional conflict when Marshall became Chief Justice. In the
Court's opinion in Marbury v. Madison,"" Marshall firmly established
the doctrine of judicial review with the result that judicial appoint-
ments made by Adams were validated in opposition to the position
taken by Jefferson, though they were not enforced."'
It was, however, the trial of Aaron Burr, with Marshall sitting as
a trial judge which presented the hardest test for his maintenance
of judiciousness, since the trial of Burr was of major significance to
President Jefferson. A major confrontation occurred when Burr
demanded presentation to the court of a letter from Jefferson to
General Wilkinson, which Burr alleged would reveal a direction "to
destroy my person and my property. 7 °  Marshall did issue a
subpoena for the letter. Acknowledging that the subpoena would
be viewed as an exercise of his discretion in a way vexing to Jeffer-
son, he went to pains to establish that the law and justice required
that all evidence be brought to the court in a case involving the life
and liberty of a defendant. "The point of Marshall's decision, and
its genius, was the affirmation of the court's role as protector of the
individual."'71 The trial, itself, resulted in Burr's acquittal.
Marshall served as Chief Justice for thirty-three years. His
opinions evidenced a judicial craft, an inventiveness, and a faithful-
ness to personal convictions established throughout his life. With
his retirement in 1834, Marshall returned to Richmond. One of the
most significant values of a life well lived is the satisfaction that it
67. Id. at 304-05.
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
69. See generally BAKER, supra note 52, at 394-417.
70. Id. at 477.
71. Id. at 482.
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brings to its subject at its close and the feeling of a sense of integrity
as one approaches death void of any sense of despair. Marshall
revealed that feeling of integrity in his own life when he remarked
in 1835: "Could I find the mill which would grind old men, and
restore youth, I might indulge the hope of recovering my former
vigor and taste for the enjoyment of life. But as that is impossible,
I must be content with patching myself up and dragging on as well
as I can."72 Marshall died within the year.
Baker's John Marshall: A Life in Law provides a wealth of his-
torical and legal matter for the interested reader. But its signifi-
cance is the development of the human side of a great man who was
dedicated to a career in law and to the primacy of the law itself.
Charles Evans Hughes
The institutional inviolability of the Court which was established
by Marshall was defended by Charles Evans Hughes more vehe-
mently than by any other justice in the Court's history, 78 with the
possible exception of the eight justices who joined in the opinion in
United States v. Nixon.74  No satisfactory biography of Charles
Evans Hughes is available, 75 and that fact alone makes The Auto-
biographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes, edited by David
Danelski and Joseph Tulchin, a valuable publication. 70  In addition,
these Notes which were dictated by Hughes after his retirement, are
significant for the insight they provide into Hughes' motivations and
his self-assessment. 77 Hughes provides an account of a life marked
with career success but characterized by psychological stress. Pres-
ent throughout the book is the feeling that the attainment of success,
72. Id. at 766.
73. See Auerbach, Book Review, 87 HAiv. L REv. 1100, 1101 (1974).
74. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
75. Several biographies of Charles Evans Hughes have been written, see, e.g.,
B. GLAD, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE ILLUSIONS OF INNOCENCE (1966); S.
HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1951); D. PERKINS,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP (1956); M.
PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951).
76. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (D. Danelski &
J. Tulchin eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES].
77. A similar volume of recollections of Justice Frankfurter is provided in FaLix
FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (H. Phillips ed. 1960).
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measured by Hughes in terms of external acclaim, and little sense
of personal satisfaction were persistent drives in his life.
A formal description of his public life is given by Hughes in these
Autobiographical Notes; however, it is the account of his youth, edu-
cation, and early career that provides the opportunity for fullest in-
sight into Hughes the man. Throughout, the Notes Hughes adopts
a matter-of-fact tone, as he describes it: "I shall not attempt an
apologia pro mea vita. It is my purpose to set down objectively the
facts concerning forebears and environment-the circumstances of
my lot and the various efforts of professional and public life.""5
Hughes' parents were both intellectually ambitious and diligent.
They pressed their son to achieve the early academic success for
which he showed a capacity. Hughes could read at three and one-
half; by the time he was eight, he could read Greek. He left home
for college at fourteen. Commenting on the difficulty of his early
training and schooling, Hughes evidences a certain antipathy for its
intensity and moralistic overtones.
During those early years . . . I was subject not only to an exceptional in-
tellectual stimulus but also to a constant and rigorous religious discipline.
It was much too constant and rigorous, for in the end it largely defeated
its own purpose by creating in me a distaste for religious formalities. .... 7.
College, for Hughes, was at first a liberating experience. At
Madison College, now Colgate, Hughes developed a sense of inde-
pendence and self-assurance. He even took up card playing which
had been forbidden at home. In commenting about his departure
from Madison to Brown after only two years, Hughes observed: "In
leaving Madison I felt emancipated from rivalries for college honors
and I had the notion that it would be delightful to follow my bent
without any concern for marks. 80  Throughout his life Hughes
manifested an affinity for competition, while continually feeling a de-
sire to avoid it. This competitive spirit, apparently instilled by his
parents' great demands and high expectations, had a disquieting in-
fluence upon his entire life. It naturally developed, that despite
his desire to withdraw from academic competition at Brown, Hughes
performed well in all his studies, stood third in his class, and received
78. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NoTs, supra note 76, at 2.
79. Id. at 25.
80. Id. at 37.
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an award which attested to his "ability, character, and attainment."'"
His career objectives during these college years were teaching and
the ministry.
The class prophet in his college class had predicted his becoming
a lawyer82 but Hughes' entry into a life in law did not come until
after some experience in teaching. During this time, Hughes began
to read law and in order to accelerate his progress he enrolled in
the Columbia Law School.
Before entering law school, Hughes applied for a position with
Edgar Gray, a promoter of the Gill Rapid Transit Company.8 3 His
experience in this position provides an insight into the character of
Hughes and the way in which he dealt with problems of business
ethics and dubious legality. A condition for obtaining the position,
according to Gray, was a small investment, the sum of which Hughes
obtained from his father. Hughes and his father checked the sound-
ness of the company with the founder of the enterprise, bankers,
and a Wall Street firm. Soon after he began to work for the com-
pany, Hughes observed letters signed in Gray's hand using other per-
sons' names; in fact, Gray began using Hughes' name to sign letters
and telegrams. Although the situation was distressing to Hughes,
he had a desire to retain the position, if at all possible.
I felt that it must be stopped at once. Still the affairs of the Rapid Transit
Company seemed to be in good order and I did not wish to lose my job.
In the midst of my anxiety, I had an inspiration. It occurred to me to go
to the Astor Library and consult the newspaper files to find out if Mr. Gray
and his enterprises had been mentioned. . . . I found in the New York
Tribune an account of the electric light company, which had come to grief,
and that Edgar Gray was no other than William E. Gray, a notorious
character. 8 4
With this information about Gray's unsavory and criminal back-
ground, Hughes confronted Gray and then approached Gill and
informed him of his findings and asked for and received the return
of the sum he had invested in the company. With the return of his
money and two weeks severance pay, Hughes left the employ of the
transit company. He does not indicate that he contacted officials
81. Id. at 45.
82. Id. at 49.
83. Id. at 53-54.
84. Id. at 53.
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with the information he discovered. Hughes' career was marked by
such efforts to preserve his reputation inviolate, but evidenced by
restraint in pursuing an attack on what others would consider unethi-
cal or illegal conduct.
At Columbia, Hughes was taught by the "Dwight Method" which
used textbooks, rather than casebooks, as the basis for recitations.
The other aspects of his law school experience involved the informal
arrangements of small private review groups, a legal fraternity, and
moot court. Complementing his law school work, Hughes obtained
positions as a law clerk. While Hughes' record at law school was
solid, he revealed the same aversion to competiton which he
evidenced at Madison: "The law school offered a prize for the best
essay and the highest marks on a special examination, but I did not
enter that competition, which was entirely voluntary, as I did not wish
to attempt the extra effort after a hard year."'8 5
Hughes' career in the New York bar provides a prototype of the
contemporary experience of a young, well-connected male graduate
of a prestigious law school who accepts a position as an associate in
a Wall Street law firm and who through work and the proper per-
sonality is invited into partnership. Hughes well describes the
sociology of "successful" practice.
The giants of the profession were retained in more important litigations and
dominated the legal scene. Their firms were entrenched financially and so-
cially, having as regular clients the large moneyed institutions and transpor-
tation companies. These highly privileged firms seemed to hold in an en-
during grasp the best professional opportunities and to leave little room for
young aspirants outside the favored groups . . . . If the young lawyer sees
to it that his work is of the best and if by intelligence and industry he
stands well in his own generation, he can afford to await his share of the
privileges and responsibilities which to that generation are bound to
come. 86
Experiencing the gradual increase in responsibility Hughes moved
from writing briefs, to representing clients in minor matters, to
handling negotiations, and finally to conducting major litigation.
Even during the years of his early practice, Hughes devoted energies
to social and civic activities; he remained active in his college frater-
nity and he joined the Association of the Bar of New York and the
85. Id. at 60.
86. Id. at 76.
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Republican Club. By 1887, he was active in political campaigns and
becoming a member of the professional and civic establishment of
New York City.
Hughes viewed a career at the bar, at the outset, as providing
special opportunities for material success. Moreover, lawyering
seemed to him to require an adroitness of which he was confident;
the law practice which he was undertaking was "a highly competitive
field and called for agility as well as resourcefulness. 8 7  Yet,
Hughes' aversion for competition and strenuous work continued to
plague him and to undermine his satisfaction with his work. Con-
stantly throughout his career he sought escape: ". . . I needed
more than exercise to overcome the fits of depression which often
followed exertions in difficult cases. A good deal of my professional
work seemed to be unrequited drudgery and I needed periods of
complete freedom, with joyous and uplifting experiences. ' 8
Joining his classmate P. C. Cravath and Walter S. Carter, a promi-
nent member of the New York bar, Hughes helped form the prede-
cessor to one of the nation's major law firms.8° Among its first
clients was Westinghouse. 9
After approximately three years of practice, Hughes, through the
intervention of a former associate was offered a professorship in law
at Cornell. 1 Although describing the motivation for accepting the
position as one of intellectual curiosity, Hughes reveals a mixed
motivation. It is difficult to accept his casual dismissal of material
wealth, a major goal of his practice, but it is easy to see revealed
again his desire to avoid competition and strenuous work.
[I] was offered a full professorship in the Law School, which I accepted.
This action greatly distressed Mr. Carter. He thought it absurd. He
pointed out my professional opportunities--even the prospect of what he
termed "opulence." That did not attract me. While I naturally enjoyed
receiving the fruits of my work, I had labored just as hard in cases involv-
ing small amounts, or where we were not paid at all, as in others. It was
the nature of the questions involved, the interests of clients, and especially
the opportunities for advocacy, which had appealed to me. Now 1 was tired,
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id. at 114-15.
89. See generally R. SwAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS P.MECESSORS, 1819-
1948 (1948).
90. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 76, at 84.
91. Id. at 88-89.
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and the offer of an academic retreat, affording what I thought would be
abundant time for study and reading, was so attractive that I could not re-
fuse it.92
Hughes was greatly disappointed with his teaching career. First, he
found a need for greater financial reward and second, and more
importantly, he did not find a respite from competition and toil.
I saw that soon I should have to retrench to the point of serious inconveni-
ence or should need a larger salary, which I knew it would be difficult to
get as the University wished to maintain its salary scale without discrimina-
tions. Again, congenial as were my surroundings and work at Cornell, I
was disappointed in the failure to have the opportunities for general reading
and study to which I looked forward. Far from being on academic retreat,
I found Cornell to be a hive of industry, and aside from the occasional and
enjoyable evenings I spent with my colleagues, my life was one of constant
toil; in truth, I was about as busy with my courses as I had been with my
practice in New York.9 3
So Charles Evans Hughes returned to the practice of law.
His career in public service began when he was appointed counsel
in the Gas and Insurance Investigations in New York in 1905-1906.
He reluctantly accepted this position, doubting his own competence
and questioning the efficacy of legislative investigations. More
significantly, Hughes evidenced a dislike of public scrutiny while feel-
ing a compulsion to accept public office.
That still left the question whether I was competent for such an under-
taking, having no experience in legislative undertakings, I distrusted my ca-
pacity and I hated the idea of work where the public eye would be upon
every step. . . . I felt, however, that it would be cowardly to refuse; that
there was a public service of importance to be rendered and that if I went
at it with the single purpose of doing a thorough professional job, that at-
titude would be recognized and in some way I should get through.
94
While the insurance investigations were particularly important and
inured to the benefit of Hughes' reputation, the experience was
accompanied by the dread and strain which characterized most of
Hughes' activity.
At times, I felt the responsibility almost too heavy to bear and the work
too exacting to be continued. . . . [O]ccasionally at night I would feel worn
out and utterly depressed and would exclaim to my wife .... I simply
can't go on." But after a night's rest, I would start again.95
Hughes' performance in the insurance investigation brought
92. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 96.
94. Id. at 120.
95. Id. at 127.
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him offers of the nomination for mayor of New York, which he re-
fused, and then the Republican nomination for governor of New
York, which he reluctantly accepted. As governor he was involved
in continuing antagonism with party regulars. Although he felt a
strong affinity for the principles adopted by the Republican party,
he opposed what he regarded as abuses by entrenched party mem-
bers in the Assembly and in party offices. The program of state
government under Hughes was one of increasing activity along with
rigorous requirements of administrative efficiency and accountability.
Again, while his work as governor brought Hughes renown, so much
so that he was considered as a candidate for President in 1908, he
was reluctant to accept a second term. "Physically, I have been liv-
ing on my reserves and I was nervously worn. Financially, I was
making large inroads upon my savings. ... 6 Hughes did, how-
ever, accept the nomination and was re-elected. He enjoyed a suc-
cessful term until he resigned in 1910 to accept a position as Associ-
ate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Hughes had to reconcile his acceptance of the position on the
Court with his obligation to fulfill his term as governor. Some of
the considerations he reflected upon were the limited time remaining
in the term, his disinclination to remain in an executive office, and
his sense of duty to serve the public as opposed to private practice
with only limited public service. In a letter to President Taft he
expressed his chief reason, which was his desire to be a Justice.
My training and professional interest have been such that I should under-
take this work with a personal satisfaction which no other line of effort
could command in the same degree. No one could have a more profound
sense of vast responsibilities of the Supreme Court than I have . . . it also
disposes me to welcome the opportunity to devote my life to such impor-
tant service. Against such a life-work, to meet the conditions of which an
adjustment could be made, I should not for a moment set any prospect of
money-making at the bar.9 7
Hughes "found work [of the Court] very difficult," 98 and was disap-
pointed by the acrimony he found to exist among the justices. 9
Reluctantly, however, Hughes accepted the draft for the Republi-
can presidential nomination in 1916 and resigned his post on the
96. Id. at 148.
97. Id. at 160.
98. Id. at 164.
99. Id. at 168.
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Court. It was his sense of duty to the party which led him to aban-
don a position which he found demanding, but thorougly rewarding.
When Hughes lost the election he returned to practice and joined
a Wall Street firm. He accepted large fees, and was counsel in cases
involving major business enterprises as well as national unions.
Meanwhile, Hughes remained socially and politically active.
From 1921 to 1925, Hughes served as Secretary of State and
played an important and satisfying role in the conduct of foreign af-
fairs. In 1925, he again returned to practice which he described
as "large, varied and lucrative."' 100 During these years Hughes re-
mained active in public service, accepting an appointment as Judge
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1928. He con-
tinued to find his work stressful and excessively demanding but his
ambition compelled him to remain. He states, for instance that: "At
one time, however, in the Spring of 1927, I almost suffered a break-
down." 0
Twice while Hughes was Secretary of State, he was approached
by representatives of Presidents Harding and Coolidge to determine
whether he was interested in accepting the position as Chief Justice.
He refused both times. When Hoover became President, Hughes
was again approached and, in contrast to his earlier statements and
feelings, Hughes observed:
From the time of my resignation as Associate Justice in 1916, I had no
desire to return to the Bench. I should certainly have refused an offer of
an Associate Justiceship, and I did not for a moment contemplate being
chosen as Chief Justice. I was greatly surprised when this was proposed
near the end of January 1930.102
Hughes accepted the position of Chief Justice after first refusing on
the basis of "my desire not to assume further and heavy responsi-
bilities."'10
Hughes' appointment was surrounded with controversy. It was
stated in print that he was not Hoover's first choice but was offered
the position as a matter of protocol and had unexpectedly ac-
cepted.' 04 This was denied by both Hughes and Hoover.10 5 More
100. Id. at 285.
101. Id. at 287-88.
102. Id. at 291.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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importantly, his nomination was opposed because of his representa-
tion and close association with corporate interests in his private prac-
tice."0 6 Hughes was defended, however, by such eminent liberals
as Zechariah Chaffee for having acted as an advocate in the tradition
of the bar.10 7
Hughes found the normal work of the Court sufficiently demand-
ing, but it was Roosevelt's "Court Packing" plan that presented the
most difficult challenge to Hughes and to the integrity of the Court
itself. Hughes, however, presided over the Court in a manner which
weathered the storm. It was only his health and age which led him
to resign in 1941.
Hughes ended his career with satisfaction in having met his sense
of duty to public service. Measured in the eyes of his peers his
career had been a success. While ambition drove him on, one is
left with a sense of a life lived with tension and strain. For Hughes,
his life was a series of roles to be played from which a certain sense
of satisfaction was obtained. But he constantly strove to escape that
life, finding refuge in trips and vacations. There was not that sense
of ease and pleasure which one should hope to obtain from a life's
work.
William 0. Douglas
Unlike Marshall or Hughes, William 0. Douglas struggled without
wealth or family connections from a rural boyhood in Yakima, Wash-
ington, to a position as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
Like Marshall and Hughes, Douglas' childhood and early educa-
tion had a lasting impact on his character and views. Similar to Mar-
shall, Douglas found life a series of challenges from which he gained
great satisfaction and a sense of identity. Like Hughes, Douglas was
plagued from early years by a feeling of inadequacy and a need to
prove himself; but unlike Hughes, Douglas seems to have become
master of his own drives and needs so that he is not beset by the
nagging feelings of stress and exhaustion which so dominated Hughes'
life. While Douglas chose a career in public service after early frus-
trations as an academic, his career was one accepted with an eager-
105. See D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, THE NiNE OLD MEN, 74-75 (1937).
106. AuTroBioGRAnmcAL NoTEs, supra note 76, at 295.
107. Id. at 295-96. See also Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES,
358-62 (1941).
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ness which he has managed to sustain. More like Marshall, Doug-
las suggests he would not have lived his life in any other way.
Go East Young Man'08 is an autobiographical account'0 9 of Doug-
las' struggles from his birth until his appointment to the Supreme
Court in 1939.110 Two main themes can be observed in his auto-
biography: the growth of an individual against physical and social
obstacles and the development of a social and political philosophy
reflective of experience and sympathy.
At the age of three Douglas suffered an attack of poliomyelitis,
which resulted in a general weakening of his health and damage to
his legs. But more importantly, the care of his mother and the scorn
of his classmates gave him a sense of inferiority which he fought suc-
cessfully to overcome. It was, however, the poverty of his youth
which had the most lasting effect on Douglas' personality and atti-
tudes. His rejection of the wealthy establishment was made early.
I was hardly fourteen, but I knew the Rich who were the pillars of Yakima.
I did not hate or despise them but I had no love or respect for them. They
treated labor as scum; they controlled the police; some of them had invest-
ments in Yakima's brothels. They went to church and were "godly" men;
but I had nothing in common with them."'
Douglas overcame his physical infirmities by hiking and mountain
climbing. His experience has had the effect of making him a con-
firmed environmentalist." 2 More significantly, the experience of
nature had profound effects on his character and his self-image.
I took my early hikes into the hills to try to strengthen my legs, but they
were to strengthen me in subtler ways. . . . I do not envy those whose
introductions to nature was lush meadows, lakes and swamps where life
108. W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN, THE EARLY YEARS, THE AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (1974) [hereinafter cited as Go EAST YOUNG MAN].
109. For a well-stated critique of the limits of autobiography in general and of
this autobiography in particular, see Latham, Book Review, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1656
(1974).
110. Other biographical sources are available, although no comprehensive or de-
finitive biography has yet been written. See V. COUNTRYMAN, DOUGLAS OF THE SU-
PREME COURT (1959); Rodell, As Justice Bill Douglas Completes His First Thirty
Years on the Court, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 704 (1969); L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1969). For the equivalent of an
intellectual biography of Justice Douglas, see, V. COUNTRYMAN, THE JUDICIAL REC-
ORD OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (1974).
111. Go EAST YOUNG MAN, supra note 108, at 7.
112. Id. at 203-47. See also W. DOUGLAS, A WILDERNESS BILL OF RIGHTS
(1965).
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abounds. The desert hills of Yakima had a poverty that sharpened percep-
tion .... It is the old relationship between scarcity and value, one of
the lessons which the foothills of Yakima taught me.1 13
Similarly, Douglas' experiences as a solitary youth, and his work
experiences in an ice factory and as an informant for the local vice
squad gave him a profound sympathy for the working class and a
lasting antipathy for the social elite.
While there were many children's parties in Yakima, we were never invited
to a single one, and we were far too poor to have one in our own home.
We grew up never seeing the inside of another home. In the after years
I thought it was a blessing that I had not. For if I had been united with
the elite of Yakima even by so tenuous a cord, I might have been greatly
handicapped. To be accepted might then have become a goal in later life,
an ambition that is often a leveling influence. To be accepted means liv-
ing in the right area, wearing the right hat, thinking the right way, saying
the right thing. What it means in the law is a Dean Acheson or John
Foster Dulles or a reactionary president of the Bar Association. They
cause all the beauty to disappear in a pontificial emptiness. 1 14
While Douglas never sought acceptance into the social establish-
ment, his driving ambition enabled him to gain entry into the estab-
lishment of merit. It was through education that his success came
and his experience compelled in him a belief in an intellectual elite;
this belief dominated his feelings about the ideal educational pro-
gram.
Whatever system was used, the average student would end his academic
career with junior college. The new tutorial institution would be geared
for the exceptional student, usually aiming at some specialty requiring grad-
uate work.
Excellence would be standard. . . . The tutorial institution would be
aimed not at standardizing ideas, but at releasing the creative potential of
every individual.
We might then in the end have a real aristocracy of talent drawn from
the vast democratic pool of people of all races and all faiths and all
standards of living. 1 1 5
Douglas graduated first in his high school class. He matriculated
at Columbia Law School where he did very well and was elected
to the Law Review, an experience which he valued highly. "Never,
up to then, did I have a brighter, happier moment in my life than
113. Go EAST YOUNG MAN, supra note 108, at 36-38.
114. Id. at 60.
115. Id. at 115.
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the day I received notice that I was an editor of the Review." 116 But
unlike Hughes, Douglas did not find law school demanding; "the in-
tellectual competition at Columbia was not as keen as I had
expected.'11 Douglas graduated second in his class.
As a result of his performance at Columbia, Douglas was asked
to join the faculty, which he did, teaching bankruptcy, damages, and
partnership. Meanwhile, he also accepted a post of Cravath, de
Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood, the Wall Street firm with which Charles
Evans Hughes had been associated after he completed law school.
Practice while teaching was a normal course at the time. Douglas,
however, left New York for a period and took up practice in the
state of Washington, not so much dissatisfied with New York as
desirous of returning home. Nevertheless, he soon returned to the
East and a full-time teaching position at Columbia, which he was
convinced he would find more challenging and satisfying.
Douglas returned to full-time teaching for reasons which are quite
similar to those given by Hughes, a chance to read and think. Un-
like Hughes, Douglas found the experience he was seeking: "When
I practiced law and taught, I was always rushing. I never had a
chance to read, reflect, reread, study, converse at leisure. I always
had to live on an intellectual subway, racing from point to point as
I tried to absorb a book on the way.""" In his position as a full-
time faculty member, Douglas observed: "My new leisure gave me
time to reflect on my past and future and put current problems in
perspective. For the first time I had the chance to browse in
libraries. Now my intellectual perspective began to acquire new
dimensions."' "19
Douglas' new intellectual experience had a disquieting effect; he
became a "renegade" in the movement for curricular reform which
was labeled "sociological jurisprudence." His continuing concern
with social welfare and justice rooted in his youthful experience was
now joined with a dedication to interdisciplinary studies.
We wanted to join forces with other disciplines at Columbia-such as busi-
ness, economics, sociology-to examine an entire area. We wanted inter-
116. Id. at 145.
117. Id. at 148.
118. Id. at 159.
119. Id.
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departmental fertilization of ideas. .... Law had become a compartmen-
talized specialty, quite remote from the actualities of life. If we could in-
tegrate the various disciplines, we could learn what the law should be, by
learning the problems with which it must deal.120
But Douglas and his collaborators' plans were soon thwarted.
I was to discover that reeducating teachers was the major stumbling block
... . Most law professors did not want to throw away the notes they had
been using for years. They were not concerned with, nor did they discuss
with their students, the bias in existing laws and whether they truly served
the public interest. 121
Frustrated, Douglas left Columbia and accepted a position at Yale
where he found an atmosphere more hospitable to his temperament
and interests. His old antagonisms to the upper class remained and
these affected his approach to the classroom, an approach of which
he remains proud.
In retrospect, it was a rather hardbitten approach, fashioned on the Socratic
method and based on the premise that in the forums of the law the soft-
spoken, philosophical advocate had no high place. So I bore down hard,
treating each student as if it were irrelevant that his father or grandfather
was a "great man." I tended to treat the class as a lion tamer in the cir-
cus treats his wards. Soon the class was in protest, sending a committee
to Dean Hutchins to have me fired. Hutchins called me in to his office
and told me what the committee had said.
I replied that the students were grandsons of very eminent and at times
disreputable characters, and that as a result of the wealth of their ancestors,
the students had been spoiled all their lives. I said I thought it was time
they learned that when they stood before a court or a jury, they would be
judged by their perception and fidelity to the law, not by their ancestors.
"It's fine with me if you fire me," I said.
"Don't be silly. I'm merely passing the complaint on to you," Hutchins
told me.
"I am inclined to bear down even harder on the spoiled brats."
"That would be revolutionary and wonderful."
And so I stayed on at Yale.1 22
At that time Douglas was also working on bankruptcy problems
in Washington, D.C. with Julius Klein, Secretary of Commerce un-
der Herbert Hoover. 23  After Roosevelt's election in 1933, Douglas
left Yale to join the New Deal Administration in the Securities and
120. id. at 160.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 164-65.
123. Id. at 175.
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Exchange Commission. There Douglas insisted on a fierce inde-
pendence in his investigative activities. By the early thirties,
Douglas seems to have fully accommodated himself to a place in the
political establishment and to the exercise of power. His description
of his activities during these years provides an important historical
account of the formative period of one major government agency.
By 1937, Roosevelt had appointed Douglas chairman of the Com-
mission on the basis of Joseph Kennedy's recommendation and
assessment of Douglas' work. Although Douglas enjoyed the power
and prestige which came with being a member of the government,
his social philosophy favoring individualism and opposing elitism
continued, as his remarks assessing his role in the S.E.C. indicate:
In this century big business has been anti-free enterprise. Acquisition of
wealth and power took priority over the development of the moral capaci-
ties of the individual. Big business behaved like bandits raiding a frontier.
The gospel of wealth was equated with man's dignity before God; exploit-
ing the community became a way of life. Material values were bedecked
with moral or ethical values.'
2 4
Just as Douglas maintained a hostility to wealth while becoming
a member of the establishment, he developed a criticism of the
bureaucracy of government while serving in governmental positions.
The great creative work of a federal agency must be done in the first
decade of its existence if it is to be done at all. After that it is likely to
become a prisoner of bureaucracy and the inertia demanded by the Estab-
lishment of any respected agency . . . . [M]ost agencies become so
closely identified with the interests they are supposed to regulate, eventually
they are transformed into spokesmen for the interest groups. 125
Douglas includes an account of his own efforts to keep the S.E.C.
independent by resisting efforts to place it in a larger bureaucratic
structure such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and by re-
fusing to make concessions to powerful private interests which used
important political connections in efforts to pressure and influence
S.E.C. decisions and activities.
Douglas reveals the importance in his life of the personalities and
influence of other persons. He is conscious of the early influence
of his mother, teachers, and friends. But as significant were the re-
lationships he formed with Joseph Kennedy of the S.E.C., Justice
124. Id. at 295-96.
125. Id. at 297.
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Harlan Stone and most importantly President Franklin Roosevelt,
whom he admired and who was primarily responsible for Douglas'
career in public service and his appointment to the Supreme Court.
People of strong personality and character have had as much influ-
ence on Douglas' life as his own struggle for health and position.
Douglas pleads a lack of ambition for a position on the Court: "I
never even dreamed of being there. I did dream of being Chief
Forester. I dreamed of being professor of English literature and,
later dean of the Yale Law School. ... 126 Moreover, Douglas
asserts that he had had no desire for public position prior to his ex-
perience on the S.E.C. "I never had a yen for public office ...
Indeed, I grew up holding all such offices in disrespect, as I thought
that most officeholders were either corrupt or represented some
special, selfish interest."'12 7 Just as Hughes was criticized at the time
of his appointment as being too closely aligned with corporate inter-
ests, amazingly enough, some newspapers criticized Douglas "for not
being as liberal as he was supposed to be" and for being "lined up
with Wall Street." 128  While nothing in Douglas' career qualifies him
for the radical appellation that was applied to him in the late sixties,
one can hardly deny that a liberal philosophy guides his life and
thought.12 9  This fact was recognized by the New Deal Congress
which overwhelmingly confirmed his appointment. Douglas ac-
cepted his new position with a sense of resignation which belies the
significance of a career which has received wide acclaim.
And so I came to the Court without personal ambition ever playing a part
I was of course overwhelmed by the honor. But it was not in any
126. Id. at 455. Charles Evans Hughes professed the identical lack of ambition
for a position on the Supreme Court.
I have frequently been asked if I did not cherish such an ambition and I
have answered, "Not for an instant." Of course, I was fully aware of the
special combination of circumstances which would make such an appoint-
ment possible, and aside from that, my aspirations were more modest and
I never gave it a thought. I dreamt of nothing more than a reasonable
measure of professional success.
AuTOBIOGRAPHIcAL NOTES, supra note 76, at 81.
127. Go EAST YOUNG MAN, supra note 108, at 456.
128. Id. at 464.
129. For an account of his career as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, see,
V. COUNTRYMAN, THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS (1974).
For a series of appreciations, see Earl Warren, Warren Burger, Michael Sovern &
Sidney Davis, In Honor of Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas, 74 COL. L. REv. 341
(1974).
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degree a fulfillment, as it would have been to many of my friends who had a
deep longing for that position. Not being a fulfillment it was, in a sense, an
empty achievement. At first I did not like the work; it took me a few years
to accommodate myself to the daily routine. Perhaps I was too young.
Perhaps I had too much excess energy.' 30
Douglas came to enjoy his work in the Court; he never found it
the onerous burden that Hughes did. But Douglas refused to let
his position become the totality of his life and he ends his autobi-
ography with a defense of his active role in public affairs which he
claims as a right and duty. "A man or woman who becomes a Jus-
tice should try to stay alive; a lifetime diet of the law alone turns
most judges into dull, dry husks."' 1 This autobiography stands as
a monument to Douglas' zest for life and as a model for a satisfying
life lived in law.
B. BIOGRAPHIEs OF LEGAL ACADEMICIANS
On first thought, a biography of a legal academic would seem to
provide a certain prescription for boredom. While the "secret lives"
of persons so employed should be no less interesting than those of
others, a career of pedantry seems doomed for obscurity. Biog-
raphies of legal scholars are not numerous, but those that have been
written put to rest these initial impressions. An outstanding biog-
raphy of an American legal academic which has not yet been sur-
passed is Samuel Williston's Life and Law: An Autobiography.3 2
Nevertheless, there is a continual and increasing flow of biographies
of American law teachers and scholars.
Too often the only accounts of the lives of noteworthy legal aca-
demics are biographical references of the Who's Who sort. 113 Other
sources of biographical information are the commemorations some-
times published to note careers of living law scholars but more usu-
ally as memorials to well-known scholars." 4 When more extensive
130. Go EAST YOUNG MAN, supra note 108, at 465.
131. Id. at 469.
132. S. WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1940).
133. See, e.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS (1974). This is an annual publication providing biographical information
on all American law professors.
134. See, e.g., Sacks, In Memoriam: Alexander Mordecai Bickel, 88 HARV. L.
Rv. 689 (1975).
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biographies of scholars are written, they are frequently intellectual
biographies or critical commentaries on their scholarly productions.
The World and Ideas of Ernst Freund 5 by Oscar Kraines is an ex-
ample of such a work. While such endeavors provide very little in-
sight into the personal life or satisfactions obtained from a career,
they do make a systematic presentation of the individual's thought
and the influences which generated it. They have their counterparts
in the intellectual biographies of judges which give an account of
their opinions and influence on legal development13 6 and in books
which describe important cases litigated by notable practitioners. 13 7
Ernst Freund
Ernst Freund's most significant work was in the areas of legislation
and administrative law where as teacher and scholar he attempted
to cope with the problems of drafting and discretion. His major
publications deal with the police power of government,' 3 8 administra-
tive law, 139 and principles of legislation. 140 It was Freund's ap-
proach, during the first third of this century, to the complex problems
of industrialization and urbanization that set him apart from other
commentators.' 4' Modern American society, according to Freund,
would require legislative and executive or administrative solutions.
The first approach led him to consider the police powers and stand-
ards for legislation; the latter caused him to consider the question
of discretion and the methods of the administrative process.
135. 0. KRAINEs, THE WORLD AND IDEAS OF ERNST FREUND: THE SEARCH FOR
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1974) [hereinafter
cited as THE WORLD AND IDEAS OF ERNST FREUND]. See also Allen, Preface to
ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1965), which provides a
short biographical essay on Freund.
136. See, e.g., V. COUNTRYMAN, THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS (1974); H. BILL, THE VISION AND THE DREAM OF JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK
(1975).
137. See, e.g., G. GETTY & J. PRESLEY, PUBLIC DEFENDER (1974); P. HOFFMAN,
TIGER IN THE COURT (1973).
138. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS (1904).
139. E. FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1911) (2nd ed. 1928); E.
FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (1928).
140. E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1917); E. FREUND, LEG-
ISLATIVE REGULATION: A STUDY OF THE WAYS AND MEANS OF WRITrEN LAW (1932).
141. THE WORLD AND IDEAS OF ERNST FREUND, supra note 135, at 13-14.
19751
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Ernst Freund was born in 1864 in New York, but was educated
and reared in Germany in a middle class Jewish environment. 42 He
returned to New York in 1884. His first teaching post, like that of
Douglas, was at Columbia University. After two years, he moved
to the University of Chicago where he rose to prominence and ex-
erted a strong influence in the development of the "home rule" form
of municipal government in Chicago. While at first attracted by the
interdisciplinary approach which so impressed Douglas, Freund came
to believe that a professional school with a disciplinary emphasis was
more appropriate. "Freund was instrumental in convincing [the
president of the University of Chicago] that the more urgent need
was for a professional school of high standards and that emphasis on
research would naturally develop in such an institution."' 43  Yet,
Freund's interests and activities ranged broadly; he participated in
the formation of the American Political Science Association and was
influential in Illinois statutory and Chicago ordinance develop-
ment. For many years Freund was active and influential in the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws.
Freund's major emphasis was on the effect of government actions,
whether legislative or administrative, on the rights of the individual.
This was a shift from the dominant focus at the turn of the century
which was on an efficient exercise of state power. This involved
a shift from politics and public administration to a consideration of
constitutional limitations and public law. By the time of his death,
his influence was felt in the increased recognition of procedural re-
quirements for legislative and administrative action which have come
to full development in our own time.
As a teacher, and as early as 1915, Freund saw limited use for
the case book method beyond the first year.' 44 As a scholar, Freund
emphasized the centrality of the social sciences to significant legal
work and thought. As a man and a scholar, Ernst Freund stands
as a model of a successful life lived in legal academia. Justice
Frankfurter summed up the life of Ernst Freund when he lectured
in 1954 at the University of Chicago.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id. at 2, citing Woodward, Ernst Freund, 19 UNrv. Rac. 39 (1933).
144. THE WORLD AND IDEAS OF ERNST FREuND, supra note 135, at 150.
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I don't think I ever met anybody in the academic world who more justly
merited the characterization of a scholar and a gentleman .... Unlike
many scholars of courtesy and kindliness, he was a man of strong convic-
tions. But in his case passion was behind his judgment and not in front
of it ....
Ernst Freund was a scholar and not a pedant. His specialized compe-
tence in the field in which he was a master and . .. a pioneer was set in
the context of a wide and deep culture . . . . He was a pioneer in two
domains which, until his coming, were non-existent in our legal scholarship,
namely, administrative law and legislation .... 145
Roscoe Pound
A more conventional biography of a legal academic has been
provided by David Wigdor in Roscoe Pound: Philosopher of Law.146
This is the most comprehensive and by far the best biography of this
giant of modern legal education. 47 It is, for the most part, an ac-
count of the experiences and influences which gave rise to Pound's
legal thought. Pound rejected Langdell's theory of law as a system
of rules for a "sociological jurisprudence [which] blended legal con-
cepts with pragmatism and social science into a new synthesis"'148 and
championed a theory of law which responded to social reality rather
than existing as a system of abstract principles. This preference, ac-
cording to Wigdor, was largely the result of his environment, physi-
cal and social.
Pound grew up in a vibrant frontier environment, reminiscent of
John Marshall's early life.
The community and region in which Pound grew to maturity placed a
premium on growth and development. This environment undoubtedly
145. Id. at 153, citing F. FRANKFURTER, THE ERNST FREUND LECTURE: SOME OB-
SERVATIONS ON SUPREME COURT LITIGATION AND LEGAL EDUCATION 1 (1954).
146. D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974) [hereinafter cited
as ROSCOE POUND].
147. This biography places major emphasis on the work of Pound as a philoso-
pher of law but it does provide insight into the career of Pound as a teacher and
administrator. See Griswold, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1343 (1975).
Pound had a towering intellect, and his contributions deserve continuing re-
assessment. Dr. Wigdor has presented a comprehensive and perceptive re-
view of his work in the philosophy of law. There is ample room for further
work on Pound, and on his contributions to law and to legal education. We
may hope that they will be of the same quality as this book.
For an earlier biography, see P. SAYRE, THE LIFE OF ROSCOE POUND (1948).
148, RoscoE POUND, supra note 146, at ix.
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helped prepare him for a positive conception of social and institutional
change and gave him confidence in man's ability to control his destiny.
Furthermore, the frontier legacy and the fascination of the plains created
an environment with an emphasis on diversity.
149
His parents provided a stimulus for and expectation of successful in-
tellectual development: "Both parents were highly educated and
placed great value on learning."'1 0  Moreover, his father was a
lawyer.
Pound began his studies in botany in his native Nebraska and his
entrance into the Harvard Law School in 1889 was a concession to
his father's wishes. Unlike Douglas, Pound arrived at law school
with ample funds. He took quickly to the cultural and politi-
cal life of Boston which he continued to enjoy when he later returned
to Harvard as a faculty member and dean. Although only remaining
at Harvard as a student for a year, Pound left his law school experi-
ence with a sense of enthusiasm for law and legal study.
At least he knew that he had become vitally interested in the mysteries of
the law . . . . All of his teachers led him to a judge-centered view of the
legal process, a position not uncongenial for the son of a judge. In short,
Harvard encouraged him to challenge the legal system within the context
of that system. Pound had acquired a foundation for his pursuit of law
and its relationship to society.151
Pound's return to Nebraska immediately involved him in the prac-
tice of law, but he continued for a decade to involve himself quite
extensively in botany. It was not until his appointment to the
Nebraska Supreme Court Commission to assist in clearing the court's
docket that he largely abandoned science. Yet, his scientific studies
had a profound effect on his view of the law as a developmental sys-
tem with a need to accommodate the circumstances and require-
ments of the social environment. Pound's later writings in sociologi-
cal jurisprudence mirrored his earlier botantical scholarship which
argued that plant formation occurred in a "biological community in
which each factor has more or less interaction with every other fac-
tor, a relation determined not merely, not necessarily, by the fact
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id. at 47.
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of association, but also a result of biological forces induced by physi-
ological and meterological phenomena.""' 2
Pound's career as a practitioner, like that of Marshall's, was made
easier by the prominence of his distinguished pioneer family. Yet,
he also possessed ability and ambition which brought him recogni-
tion in his own right. He chose a general practice which later
served him well in his comprehensive approach to legal theory.
Nevertheless, it is Wigdor's premise that Pound's accommodation to
convention, which assured his success, and prominence, was the most
significant limitation on the originality and development of his
thought.
Pound was aware of this conventional aspect of his life and thought. A
few years after his return to Lincoln, he observed, in an unusual moment
of self-awareness, his tendency to accept existing institutions and conven-
tional standards. "Why am I in the Law?" he asked. "Why because my
father wished it. Why do I make a pretense of being civilized when I am
at heart one of the most uncivilized creatures at large? Because I have a
certain family standard to maintain. Fashion, convention and a wholesome
fear of the laws; there you have the explanation of everything in my
life."1 5 3
This conventional attitude, the author asserts, explains in part why
Pound chose a more established profession over a life in science,
which was not yet recognized as an important career. Moreover, it
is reflected in his choice of law itself which is steeped in tradition
and characterized by a conservative element. Wigdor, however, at-
tempts to show that Pound's life and thought were marked by a ten-
sion between an instrumentalist and relativistic view which obtained
support from his botanical and evolutionary studies and an organic
conception of self-regulating mechanisms toward which his view of
convention and tradition impelled him. His family and education
encouraged a questioning attitude yet forced him toward a conven-
tional career. His experience at the bar was concerned with reform
while involving him in a search for fundamental, yet flexible,
principles which could guide the more conservative judiciary which
he favored over the legislature.
When Pound was named dean of the Nebraska Law School,
152. Id. at 57, citing R. POUND & F. CLEMENTS, PHYTOGEOGRAPHY OF NEBRASKA
161 (2d ed. 1900).
153. Id. at 71-72.
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formal legal education was still in its infancy. Pound spearheaded
the movement away from a part-time practitioner faculty to a full-
time faculty of scholars. His Harvard Law School experience of-
fered a model which he attempted to emulate. Much like Douglas
two decades later, Pound urged the development of law as an aca-
demic discipline infused with the insights of other areas of study.
[Hle was convinced that the law school must do more than "teach law and
make lawyers." In order to produce graduates who were more than techni-
cians, legal study had to be informed by disciplines such as history and
philosophy. "Doubtless, many will smile," Pound mused, "when I speak
...of philosophy." Yet, attitudes about law merely reflected more funda-
mental assumptions that were often unexpressed and unrecognized. Laws
were not created in a vacuum, and they must not be studied in a vacuum.'
54
Legal education, for Pound, was to have a practical result in its influ-
ence on the practicing bar.
The new prestige of legal education would make the teaching of law a re-
spected professional role, and faculties would develop more depth, expertise,
and impact. A pragmatic jurisprudence would eventually replace existing
mechanical conceptions, for the new corps of professors would give students
an appreciation for the social dimension of law.' 55
Pound's reform of the Nebraska Law School required support
which he did not always feel was forthcoming. As a result, he re-
signed his deanship at Nebraska in his second term. At the urging
of students, faculty and administrators, and with promises of added
support from the regents of the university, he reconsidered and
agreed to return as dean. This new support brought higher salaries,
new faculty positions, and the addition of a law library. Thus, while
Pound was active as a scholar publishing books and articles, he
managed to be an effective dean and law school administrator.
From Nebraska, Pound went to Northwestern University as a
faculty member. In part, Pound felt that he had done all the build-
ing possible for a time at Nebraska and Northwestern offered a posi-
tion of some national prominence. Wigdor describes its attraction:
"The Northwestern University School of Law was one of the finest
law schools in the country. Its excellent library, commitment to
scholarship, and light teaching schedules enabled the faculty to pur-
sue ambitious research projects."'156 The lure was of the type to at-
154. Id. at 106-07.
155. Id. at 107.
156. Id. at 133.
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tract a scholar. While in Chicago, Pound began his systematic study
of criminal law which provided a basis for some of his most signifi-
cant writings' 157 and was an impetus for further development of his
interdisciplinary approach and his concept of "social engineering."
He urged:
a comprehension of the point of view of all; that instead of the alienist and
the psychologist and the sociologist and the jurist and the economist going
their several paths and throwing each his individual light upon our system
of punitive justice, the light of all these be concentrated into one ray which
shall throw upon our system of punitive justice the combined wisdom of all
those who are entitled to bring scientific knowledge to bear upon it.158
During this period, Pound served as a journal editor and helped to
found a number of publications which would provide a forum for his
ideas. 59
Although Northwestern had been hospitable, search for prestige
and the association with a number of notable scholars including
Ernst Freund, caused Pound to accept a position on the University
of Chicago faculty, even though the salary was less. At Chicago,
Pound turned his attention to procedural reform, the area which was
of equal concern to Freund at the time. Simplification of procedure
was the main characteristic of the program Pound urged. A corol-
lary to this program was a rejection of what Pound called the "juris-
prudence of conceptions" and the urging of a pragmatic sociological
jurisprudence. Rather than a deductive system, Pound espoused an
approach which would test legal conclusions by their effect and con-
sequence. Pound's opposition to conventional jurisprudential
schools-analytical, historical, and natural law-put him at odds with
much of the mainstream of contemporary legal thought. But his
legal scholarship was recognized and he was invited to join the
Harvard Law faculty in 1910. Pound was convinced that his influ-
ence would be greatest from a position at Harvard and it was there
that he became identified as the leading proponent of sociological
jurisprudence in America.
Pound's ideas, of course, were not generated in a vacuum. He
157. See, e.g., R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1945) and R. POUND,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN CITY-A SUMMARY (1922).
158. ROSCOE POUND, supra note 146, at 143-44.
159. See, e.g., the ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW of which Pound was the editor from
1907-1909 and on which he exerted a very strong influence.
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was in fact influenced greatly by the philosophical movement known
as pragmatism and by a pervasiveness of critical relativism which had
eroded classical theory in both history and economics. At Harvard,
Pound began to synthesize his ideas and work them into a systematic
approach to law. "Pound had already developed a view of law that
rejected formalism and finality, and within months after his return
to Harvard in 1910 he began to mold the gropings of a decade into
a comprehensive legal philosophy."' 60 This statement of a compre-
hensive philosophy of law was congruent with the ideas Pound had
identified as central to pragmatism. He expressed this relationship
to contemporary philosophical trends most unmistakably.
The sociological movement in "jurisprudence," he announced, "is a move-
ment for pragmatism as a philosophy of law; for the adjustment of prin-
ciples and doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern rather than
to assumed first principles; for putting the human factor in the central place
and relegating logic to its true position as an instrument.1 61
All legal ideas, in the end, were for Pound to be judged as
instruments: "[t]hink of legal principles as instruments rather than
as external pigeonholes into which all human relations must be
made to fit.'' 1 2 This instrumental view of law came to dominate
the American legal conscience and is only now under attack as fail-
ing to account for the place of fundamental principles of law based
on human values central to democratic society.'
Yet, as Wigdor points out, Pound himself did not subscribe un-
ambiguously to an instrumental view of law. There was, in Wigdor's
terms, an unresolved dualism in the tension between instrumentalism
and organicism in Pound's thought.' While urging that law should
be based on social realities, Pound continued to maintain a strong
allegiance to the common law tradition. A trilogy of commitments:
organicism, traditionalism and professionalism led Pound to conclude
that "the law will absorb the new economics and the new social
160. RoscoE POUND, supra note 146, at 186.
161. Id. at 187.
162. Id. at 188, citing Pound, Making Law and Finding Law, 82 CENT. L.J. 358
(1916).
163. See Hermann, The Fallacy of Legal Procedure as Predominant Over Sub-
stantive Justice: A Critique of "The Rule of Law" in John Rawls' "A Theory of
Justice," 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1408 (1974).
164. ROSCOE POUND, supra note 146, at 207-32.
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science,"' 65 that the tradition of the judiciary would continue, and
that the law would achieve a central position in modem society.
Pound's view was a reflection of the continuing tension between
formalism and instrumentalism which characterizes modem legal
thought. In Wigdor's words, "Organicism competed with instrumen-
talism in a relentless intellectual tug-of-war."' 66
Pound found Harvard a congenial home for his teaching and
scholarship. He was well-received and respected by his colleagues,
although his work was not without criticism. Nicholas Murray
Butler, President of Columbia, who would later block curricular re-
form at the Columbia Law School and drive young William 0. Doug-
las off to Yale, dismissed sociological jurisprudence and the work of
Pound as faddish.'6 7
With the support of his colleagues at Harvard, Pound was named
dean in 1916, a position which he held for two decades. His period
of truly creative thought came to an end after this appointment and
he turned to elaborations of principles which he had already once
stated. He devoted a great amount of effort to the further strength-
ening of legal education in general and the Harvard Law School in
particular. Time had to be given to successfully fending off alumni
charges of subversion following World War I when criticisms were
launched against a number of faculty, including Pound, but centering
on Zechariah Chaffee. Pound continued to have periodic misgivings
about retaining his position, but was convinced by the entreaties of
colleagues and alumni to stay on until 1936. Pound, of course, con-
tinued active involvement in professional activities, particularly
criminal law reform. 168
Pound presided over a great growth in the Harvard Law School:
student enrollment doubled, the faculty quadrupled and the endow-
ment increased sixfold with major additions made to the physical
plant. Yet, Pound's governance of the law school brought some criti-
cism of autocratic administration. W. Barton Leach is cited for such
criticism: "Pound ran the Law School as if he had just bought 51
per cent of the stock. He neither sought nor tolerated opposi-
165. Id. at 209.
166. Id. at 230.
167. Id. at 202.
168. Id. at ch. 10.
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tion."' 16  By the end of his tenure, Pound had become stodgy in
his approach to legal education as well as to social and political con-
troversy. For example, he did not take a position on the Sacco-
Vanzetti case' 70 and was timid in resisting anti-Semitism. In educa-
tion, Pound blocked further curricular reform and refused to bring
social scientists onto the faculty as was being done at Columbia and
Yale. Perhaps as an administrator he simply did not continue to
grow; or perhaps he just became too old. In any case, at the time
of his retirement from the deanship in 1936, he had become some-
what disillusioned with legal education.
The denouement of Pound's deanship was not a happy one. During his
final year he confided . . . that there was "little left of the old spirit which
has come down from Langdell and Ames." The bitter conflicts over aca-
demic policies and personalities as well as corrosive political differences
must have made it easier for him to resign....171
With his departure from the deanship and return to teaching,
Pound found a need to defend his dedication to the judiciary in light
of the development of administrative agencies and New Deal policies
in general. Moreover, the skepticism of legal realism presented a
profound threat to his conception of the integrity of legal theory
which bound instrumentalism to organicism. Pound also resisted
those who would convert law study into policy science study. Thus,
through the thirties, Pound became even more rigid in his own
thought and position although he continued to be quite active in pub-
lic affairs and in scholarship. In 1959, he published his multi-
volumed Jurisprudence which summarized his life's work. His last
years at Harvard brought him honorary degrees and the respect of
colleagues and students. Pound died in 1964 at the age of ninety-
three, having lived a productive and satisfying life. Wigdor summa-
rized the life of Pound in terms similar to Leonard Baker's epitaph
for John Marshall: "His varied experience as an attorney, judge,
teacher, scholar, administrator, and government adviser possessed a
unifying leitmotif, a tireless devotion to the case for law."'17 2
169. Id. at 249.
170. In contrast Felix Frankfurter, then a member of the Harvard law faculty,
gave a stirring defense of the defendants, Sacco and Vanzetti. See F. FRANKFURTER,
THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETI (1927).
171. ROSCOE POUND, supra note 146, at 254.
172. Id. at 281.
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C. BIOGRAPHIES OF ATTORNEYS
John W. Davis
A practicing lawyer serves as counselor and advocate; a successful
lawyer must not only accommodate to these roles but also achieve
a sense of fulfillment in exercising these skills. The life of John
W. Davis was a life of advocacy, practiced with enthusiasm, whether
in the service of private litigants or in the service of the public. Uni-
versity of Virginia historian William H. Harbaugh has provided, in
the best tradition of the scientific biography, a very fine account of
Davis' life, Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis.7 '
Davis first practiced as an attorney in West Virginia and then in
New York where he developed a reputation on Wall Street as one
of the finest corporate lawyers in America and one of the most
active appellate advocates in the nation's history. He served briefly
as a state legislator and as Congressman, but his reputation as a pub-
lic lawyer was obtained chiefly as Solicitor General from 1913-1918.
His advocacy skills also served him as Ambassador to the Court of
St. James from 1918 to 1920 and in his unsuccessful campaign for
the presidency in 1924 as the Democratic nominee. While Davis
enjoyed a career in public affairs, most of his life was lived as an
advocate; it was as an advocate that he made his reputation and
wealth, and it was as an advocate that John W. Davis thought of him-
self.
Davis' life as an appellate advocate is fascinating, having presented
more than 140 cases before the Supreme Court. As Solicitor
General, he argued successfully the constitutionality of the child
labor laws,174 the antitrust laws,' 75 and the draft law. 176  As a private
appellate advocate his career was crowned by his successful repre-
sentation in 1952 of the steel companies who resisted President Tru-
173. W. HARBAUGH, LAwYER's LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS (1973)
[hereinafter cited as THE DER OF JOHN W. DAVIS]. For critical commentary on this
book by historians, see Gould, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 866 (1974); Auerbach,
Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1100 (1974). For a critique by legal academics,
see Marks, Book Review, 63 GEo. L.J. 849 (1975); Ely, Book Review, 72 MICH. L.
REv. 1495 (1974).
174. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
175. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
176. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918).
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man's seizure of mills during a steel strike.1 7  While one can read
with fascination the account of Davis' successful representation of the
government and his clients in these cases, the real significance of
the book ies in the account of the personal dimensions of this
"Lawyer's Lawyer," his motivations, his resolution of apparent ethi-
cal conflicts and the deep and abiding influence on his work of his
birth, social standing, and his historical environment.
Davis was born and raised in West Virginia. His father was in-
volved in state politics and was a successful practitioner with a driv-
ing compulsion to win. The family was pro-slavery, an attitude
which affected John W. Davis' segregationist beliefs in later life. As
a child Davis was well-mannered and this command of the social
graces came to be a characteristic much admired by others in his
adult life.
Washington and Lee College and Law School provided Davis with
the academic background that sustained his career. While at the
time the University lacked rigor, it provided an adequate education
and Davis achieved academic and social acceptance, if not promi-
nence. Davis reflected on his gentlemanly approach to education
when he observed: "Of what I carried away . , . the personality
of the old faculty is of greater value . . . than any book learning
they were able to drill into me. '178  Davis' law school training was
steeped in states' rights and strict construction of the constitution,1 79
taught within the framework of the case method and lecture. The
focus was almost entirely on a technical mastery of the law without
the development of critical evaluation of public policy. The result
of this training was to make Davis a competent lawyer who relied
almost entirely on the indoctrination of his youth and his private be-
liefs as his sole sources of standards for criticism of legal principles
or developments. Harbaugh describes this legacy in Davis' career:
[I]n his policy pronouncements as a leader of the bar he always
emphasized that the lawyer's proper role was that of the highly skilled tech-
nician. Unlike the architect, engineer, or artist, he asserted, "the lawyer
as a lawyer does not build or erect or paint anything. He does not create.
177. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
178. THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS, supra note 173, at 16-17.
179. Id. at 20.
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All he does is lubricate the wheels of society by implementing the rules of
conduct by which the organized life of men must be carried on." 18o
After a brief period of practice with his father in West Virginia,
Davis accepted a one year teaching position on the law school faculty
at Washington and Lee.18' While the burden of class preparation
weighed heavily on Davis, he obtained a measure of satisfaction from
a confidence that he was preparing students for practice at the bar.
Nevertheless, after a year of teaching, Harlaugh observes that: "He
finally concluded that he preferred the 'rough and tumble' of private
practice to the 'daily grind' of teaching."' 82
In his first major case, after his return to West Virginia, Davis
represented a union contesting contempt charges based on an anti-
strike injunction. The case was his father's, but young Davis was
asked to take charge. He succeeded in obtaining rather light sen-
tences for the workers, which was viewed as a victory even by the
unions."88 But Davis never again represented a union in any im-
portant case. Davis developed a reputation in West Virginia as a
legal craftsman and increasingly attracted new corporate clients.
One colleague in West Virginia summed up the qualities that made
Davis a successful practitioner in his home state:
He was intellectual without the flaw of austerity ...much less disparage-
ment of the opinions of the lesser endowed; he was dignified without loss
of friendly interest; he was scholarly without the fault of pretention; he en-
joyed success but demanded immunity from praise. He was never abstruse,
never deceptive, and never employed argument to cloud or confuse an issue.
He was always direct and explicit. Integrity was a naturally dominant ele-
ment of his character.' 8 4
Partly out of feeling that he was carrying more than his share of
his father's business and partly out of simple fascination with politics,
Davis sought escape from practice by election to the state House of
Delegates. He disliked campaigning, a dislike which would later
plague him in his unsuccessful bid for the presidency. As a state
representative, Davis evidenced a magnetic personality and within
days of his initial term was highly regarded.
180. Id. at 23.
181. Id. at 27-28.
182. Id. at 30.
183. Id. at 41.
184. Id. at 59.
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With his success as a state legislator, pressure developed for Davis
to run for Congress. His reluctance to run reflected two currents
that ran deep through his professional life: seeking financial security,
which was greater in private legal practice, and a general lack of
deep commitment to public office or any particular political position
or view.18 5  Nevertheless, Davis was nominated and elected. In
Congress, as in the state legislature, Davis quickly gained a reputa-
tion as a vigorous and active representative: "Never, said the
Speaker of the House Champ Clark in the summer of 1913, did he
recall a young Congressman earning so great a reputation in so short
of time as had John W. Davis of West Virginia."'18 6 Davis' reputa-
tion was in great part attributable to the application of his developed
skills in advocacy to his work as a legislator. This was especially
the case with his support of the anti-injunction bill which he drafted
and fought for in the House; it later became part of the Clayton Anti-
trust Act. 18 7
Yet, Davis found Congress lacking the stimulation of practice:
"The heaviest of Davis' congressional burdens was boredom ...
'Endless cunctation-active obstruction, sometimes, more often
mere passive inertia-until I wish myself at something else.' ",,
Two matters which came before the House were particularly suited
for the use of Davis' skill in advocacy. The first, the impeachment
of Robert W. Archibald, a circuit judge assigned to the United
States Commerce Court, involved the charge that the judge had en-
tered into advantageous business contracts with litigants before his
court.18 9  Davis was active in the impeachment proceeding and was
a manager of the case in the Senate. Davis, in a second case, served
on a House committee to determine what action could be taken
against a person who had assaulted a member of Congress in retalia-
tion for remarks made in official debate. The committee recom-
mended that Charles Glover be held in contempt for striking
Representative Thetus W. Sims.190
185. Id. at 64.
186. Id. at 69.
187. Id. at 72.
188. Id. at 73.
189. Id. at 85.
190. Id. at 85-86.
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The skill which Davis exercised in these two cases caused him to
be seriously considered for the position of Solicitor General. Davis,
however, was interested, for the only time in his -life, in a judicial
appointment as a member of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Davis campaigned for the position, but Wilson, who had previously
committed himself, refused him. Davis accepted the position as
Solicitor General as a consolation.
In this position, Davis was called upon to defend the myriad of
social legislation that had been enacted during the administrations
of Roosevelt, Wilson and Taft. While Davis held serious doubts
about the wisdom of the statutes, he applied all his technical skills
in successfully defending them. As Solicitor General, admiration
from the bench and bar came to Davis along with a reputation as
one of the finest appellate lawyers in the country. Those who came
to know him characterized him as possessing grace and charm,
though he was a hard driver of colleagues and of himself. Harbaugh
presents a summation of opinion on Davis' performance as Solicitor
General.
He had earned the respect and affection of all his associates. And he had
drawn warm tributes from every man who served on the Court between
1913 and 1918. Chief Justice White, who ranked him second only to Taft
as a lawyer, once remarked half seriously, "Of course, no one has due proc-
ess of law when Mr. Davis is on the other side." Hughes called him the
"clearest thinker and the best informed and prepared man" to argue before
him during his six years as Associate Justice. And Holmes regarded him
as the most complete advocate he had ever heard. "Of all persons who ap-
peared before the Court in my time," he said near the end of his life, "there
was never anybody more elegant, more clear, more concise or more logical
than John W. Davis." 191
Following his service as Solicitor General, Davis was appointed
Ambassador to the Court of St. James. He was initially reluctant
to accept the position, feeling no inclination toward foreign service
and expressing concern over the financial sacrifice the post would
require. "He did not care to be wealthy, but no amount of 'tinseled
honor' could compensate for a penniless old age."'192 Nevertheless,
the insistence of his wife and the urging of the Secretary of State
caused him to accept. The post-World War I relations between
England and the United States were strained, and Davis' skills in ad-
191. Id. at 127-28.
192. Id. at 129-30.
1975] 903
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW.
vocacy along with "his charm and sensitivity" permitted effective
representation of American interests while reducing tensions. Prob-
ably more than anything, Davis' experience in England heightened
his appetite for material wealth and led to his return to America
where he pursued income with tenacity.
In the great country houses, surrounded by lush, green lawns and beauti-
fully maintained gardens, Davis saw a way of life which struck him as the
most agreeable in the world. He loved the casual grace, the instinct for
form, the well-stocked minds, the feeling for language. And he was en-
chanted by the great houses' historical treasures. .... 193
Davis returned to the United States in 1921 to become a partner
in the Wall Street law firm of Stetson, Jennings & Russell which listed
among its corporate clients J.P. Morgan and Co. By the terms of
his contract, Davis was to have "leadership of the firm, a $50,000-
a-year guarantee, and 15 per cent of the net ($469,000 in the first
seven months of 1920). With any new business at all, this meant
that Davis could expect upwards of $150,000 a year. ' 194 Davis was
faced with the possibility that his connection with the firm and the
representation of its clients would preclude any further elected
office. As one political friend observed: "the very nature of [the
firm's] business and clientele, must have forced a final choice as to
a political career."' 95 Yet, the promise of wealth drew Davis to the
firm without reservation. When offered a position on the Supreme
Court in 1922, Davis refused it largely as a result of his desire to
accumulate material wealth. He stated in his letter rejecting the ap-
pointment that "[hie had entered practice in New York with the
fixed intention of remaining in private life until he had accumulated
'not a fortune, for that is beyond the reach both of my desire and
my opportunities in these income tax days-but some economic in-
dependence.'"""6 Davis' rejection of the position led Justice Taft
to observe in correspondence with a member of the New York bar:
"If you people in New York were not so eager for money and would
be content to live on a reasonable salary . . . you might have some
representatives on our bench, but you are all after the almighty
dollar.'' 1 7
193. Id. at 145.
194. Id. at 183.
195. Id. at 185.
196. Id. at 192.
197. Id. at 193.
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While money was a major attraction for Davis in his return to prac-
tice, he evidenced and professed a thorough liking for the work
which he accepted in the firm.
Not only did the former Ambassador hold old clients and attract new ones,
he proved to be a hard-driving industrious advocate who ground out as
much or more work as anyone else . . . . Yet he loved the forced study,
and his correspondence during these first months was almost euphoric:
"You have no idea what pleasure and enthusiasm I return to [the law].
I was never happier, either in my work or in my surroundings ....
The only thing which makes me distrust the permanence of my professional
vigor is that the loss of a case no longer depresses me as hopelessly as in
days gone by."'u9
Still Davis did not abandon public life; he observed, "I am trying
to give 100% of my time to the earning of a livelihood and still retain
25% for outside activities."'199 Among his activities was the Demo-
cratic party, and in 1924, on the 103rd ballot, Davis was nominated
for president by his party. His party was divided, and Coolige was
an incumbent. Davis was defeated by 2-to-1 in the popular vote.
The more significant objections to his election were his representa-
tion of large corporate clients to the exclusion of all others, and an
identification of Davis as an advocate of his client's activities and
abuses, much the same criticism suffered by Hughes and Douglas
upon their nomination to the Supreme Court. Davis offered, in his
defense, one of the most eloquent statements in explanation of the
lawyer as advocate.
At no time have I confined my services to a single client, and in conse-
quence I have been called upon to serve a great many different kinds of
men; some of them good, some of them indifferently good, and others over
whose character we will drop the veil of charity. Indeed, some of my
clients-thanks perhaps to their failure to secure a better lawyer-have
become the involuntary guests for fixed terms of the nation and the state.
Since the law, however, is a profession and not a trade, I conceive it to
be the duty of the lawyer, just as it is the duty of the priest or the surgeon,
to serve those who call on him unless, indeed, there is some insuperable
obstacle in the way.
No one in all this list of clients has ever controlled or even fancied that
he could control my personal or my political conscience. I am vain enough
to imagine that no one ever will. The only limitation upon a right-think-
ing lawyer's independence is the duty which he owes to his clients, once
selected, to serve them without the slightest thought of the effect such a
service may have upon his personal popularity or his political fortunes.
198. Id. at 187-88.
199. Id. at 188.
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Any lawyer who surrenders this independence or shades this duty by trim-
ming his professional course to fit the gusts of popular opinion in my judg-
ment not only dishonors himself but disparages and degrades the great pro-
fession to which he should be proud to belong. 200
Some have argued that it was not Davis' representation of cor-
porate clients, but his exclusive representation of them that provided
a basis for criticism.20' It should be noted, however, that Davis also
represented persons in cases involving civil liberties: he represented
an individual who had been denied citizenship because of conscien-
tious objection;20 2 he served as an adviser and as a character witness
for Alger Hiss in both trials; 2 8 he assisted in the representation of
J. Robert Oppenheimer in the hearings before the Atomic Energy
Commission which involved suspension of Oppenheimer's security
clearance.2 °4
More importantly, Davis' career raises the question of what role
personal philosophy should play in the representation of other per-
sons' interests; should it determine what cases are taken or what ar-
guments are made? As one commentator has noted, Davis "evaded
accountability by seeking refuge in professional duty, which was suf-
ficiently resilient to accommodate any demand upon it."' °
Davis lost the election and with that defeat he never again sought
nor held significant public office. Moreover, a stiffening conserva-
tism and a residual racism led him to resist New Deal reforms, to
oppose a growing federal government and to fight integration. Yet,
Davis was contented with his practice and enjoyed his private life.
Despite his brooding concern for the fate of the nation, Davis remained a
contented man in his private life. The grace and charm, the empathy and
sensitivity, the exquisite sense of occasion-all the qualities that had
prompted George V to call him "the most perfect gentlemen" he had ever
200. Id. at 198-99.
201. See Auerbach, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1105 (1974), where
this criticism is noted:
But the question was not whether loyal representation was provided. It was
whether the recipients of loyal representation constituted a restricted, identi-
fiable clientele whose interest shaped a lawyer's practice, values, and poli-
tics, and thus his qualification for public office.
202. THE LIFE OF JomN W. DAVIS, supra note 173, at 281-97. See United States
v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
203. THE LIFE OF JoHN W. DAVIS, supra note 173, at 445-53.
204. Id. at 454-61.
205. Auerbach, supra note 201, at 1105,
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met-became even more refined as his self-confidence deepened and his
early asperations [sic] for security, comfort, and professional eminence were
fulfilled.206:
Particularly satisfying for Davis was his profession as a lawyer.
To the end of his life, advocacy was John W. Davis' pleasure, passion and
genius. Three times or more in the 1920's and 1930's he rejected overtures
to become a college president. "I am first and last a lawyer . . . . When
I have strayed ...into other paths, I have always come back with a sense
of relief. . . . The cobbler should stick to his last." 2 0 7
George C. Edwards
The career of John W. Davis was one characterized in part by
practice in a large Wall Street firm representing major corporate
clients. In contrast, the career of George Clifton Edwards, Sr., was
spent as a sole practitioner, specializing in the representation of wor-
kers and blacks in Dallas, Texas, during the first half of this century.
Edwards' story is told in Pioneer-at-Law'0 8 by his son, a judge on
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 °9 In a forward to the book, Earl
Warren noted the significance of the work of Edwards and suggested
that without the efforts of his son to memoralize his work,21 0 it might
never be noted by succeeding generations.
This is the life story of a man without ambition or fortune or fame in a
structured society but who, with compassion and dignity, dedicated a long
professional career with profound lasting effects to the cause of the poor,
the underprivileged, and the oppressed. He, of course, was never accorded
either fame or fortune, and without flinching he willingly accepted his share
of the obliquity inflicted upon his clients and the causes he pursued.211
206. THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS, supra note 173, at 385.
207. Id. at 399.
208. G. EDWARDS, PIONEER-AT-LAW: A LEGACY IN THE PURsUrr OF JUSTICE
(1974) [hereinafter cited as PIONEER-AT-LAw].
209. The author, George Edwards, Jr., has himself had an interesting career
which has brought him a position on the U.S. Court of Appeals in Cincinnati. His
confirmation was opposed by those who criticized him for his activist practice and
membership in such organizations as the League for Industrial Democracy. See J.
GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE POWERFUL FEDERAL
JUDGE (1974).
210. See McCree, Books for Lawyers, 61 A.B.A.J. 20, 24 (1975), where the re-
view approvingly notes the commemorative quality of the book.
It is an effective and timely antidote to the deserved criticism heaped on the
legal profession because of recent reprehensible behavior of some of its
members in high places in the national government. It shines like a candle
in the dark, and I hope it will stimulate inspirational reminiscences about
other unsung heroes of the bar.
211, PIONEER-AT-LAw, supra note 208, at 9.
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The book is an example of a rather formal legal biography-the
memorial. Its value lies more in the account it gives than in its style
and form.
George Edwards, Sr., represented the poor, the black, the accused
and the worker, although he did not reject the business client who
sought his services.212 His son describes his practice, which began,
in 1910, in terms that would sound familiar to a contemporary legal
services attorney.
Dad's practice of law was trial practice. He was a poor man's advo-
cate-by choice. . . . [Miost of his cases were against parties who were
accustomed to winning without opposition. They rarely settled anything.
• .. It was not entirely a labor of love for him. He tried cases brilliantly
(or so I thought), and he won many of them. But the effort was exhaust-
ing, and when he won he took no great joy in the victory. His man should
have won-indeed, was an injustice that he should have been put to trial.
He had a good deal of criminal practice on behalf of a remarkably unsuc-
cessful and penurious clientele. He represented tenants whom landlords
were seeking to oust; home buyers whose homes banks were seeking to fore-
close; time-payment purchasers whose stoves or refrigerators, furniture
houses were seeking to repossess; workmen who were being sued by (or
were suing) loan sharks ...and persons injured in accidents that they be-
lieved, were a result of somebody else's negligence.
2 1 3
Edwards was born in Dallas, Texas. He studied at the University
of the South (Sewanee) where he prepared for the ministry, a pro-
fession he practiced upon his return to Texas. His ministry was
among the poor, the families of workers employed in cotton mills, 214
and it was here that a deep commitment to the problems of the poor
was formed. Edwards then spent some time teaching in Dallas
schools, but he sought a more active profession and became a legal
apprentice. "It was a fairly simple process in 1908 to become a law-
yer. A prospective lawyer could be admitted to practice in Texas
by passing the bar examination after studying law under supervision
of a lawyer. '"215
His first case after being admitted to the bar involved an elderly
black man accused of criminal assault upon a three-year-old white
212. Id. at 90.
213. Id. at 85-86.
214. Id. at 20.
215. Id. at 27.
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child.2 16 Before he could get to trial, however, the defendant was
lynched. This experience intensified Edwards' commitment to the
disadvantaged and convinced him of the need to protect minority
rights against unprincipled majoritarian action.
Edwards' sole avocation was reading. 17 He greatly enjoyed liter-
ature and in particular the classics. He also took an active role in
politics: in 1906 he ran for governor of Texas on the Socialist
ticket;218 in 1924 he campaigned for Robert LaFollette.2 1  He later
became a New Deal liberal.
Edwards' practice is typified by the case of Jean Riveria who, un-
employed, was threatened with eviction for failure to pay on a bank
note. After determining that the merits of the case favored the
bank, Edwards advised his client to have his wife and seven children
sit on the front bench of the courtroom on the day of the hearing.
"[T]he judge dismissed the case. He said the bank could refile its
suit when its equities were stronger .... ,"20 As the author sug-
gests: "Sometimes Dad's legal practice took on aspects of social
work."221
Edwards courageously opposed the Ku Klux Klan during his ca-
reer. Once he was physically abducted by the Klan along with two
clients whom he was defending in his capacity as an ACLU attor-
ney.2 22 The clients were beaten, although Edwards was released.
He continued undaunted, however, in his defense of civil liberties.
By the end of his career, Edwards had established himself as a
successful labor lawyer and an effective advocate for the black
people of his community. Edwards was proud of his socialist phil-
osophy which had guided him in his work. Although he was not
contented with the progress that had been made toward social justice,
he died feeling that his work had in some way made it more likely
that affluence, the recognition of individual rights and equality for
all would someday be achieved. Edwards' life lived in law was guided
216. Id. at 29.
217. Id. at 49.
218. Id. at 18.
219. Id. at 49.
220. Id. at 90.
221. Id. at 87.
222. Id. at 107-21.
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primarily by his social and political philosophy; a philosophy gave
meaning to his life and comforted him as he reviewed his life's work.
He wrote:
The one distinctive feature of my life has been my belief in and work
for Socialism. .... Socialism has been my inspiration, my philosophy, and
my guide for action ....
Holding such convictions, as I look back over the years since '99, I
find little of which to be personally proud and much about which to be
humble and chagrined. If hell is paved with good intentions, I have fur-
nished quite a block there ....
The current civil rights program and discussion are proof that democ-
racy is struggling in America to end the disgrace of racial intolerance ...
[witness] the growing appreciation of regional planning like the T.V.A., the
recognition of social responsibility for the aged and the unemployed, the
certainty that we shall settle the housing problem ...the advance of the
Negro towards political rights .... 223
Additionally, his private life brought him happiness and solace. "A
family appreciative beyond my deserts, interesting work, good
health, good eyes, good books, Texas sunlight, and hope for a finally
just and democratic society-who could reasonably ask for more?" 224
Elmer Gertz
Elmer Gertz is a lawyer who combines the skill and reputation
as an advocate enjoyed by John W. Davis225 and George C. Edwards'
practice of representing criminal defendants, unpopular clients,
and persons claiming abridgement of civil liberties. In his chatty
autobiography, To Life,226 Elmer Gertz gives an account of his fight
against censorship and the death penalty, his post-conviction repre-
sentation of Nathan Leopold, as well as an account of his youth and
some of the significant acquaintanceships which have influenced his
life.
Gertz, the son of immigrants, evidences filial devotion to his
parents and particularly to his grandfather who has always been a
legend to him. In this autobiography, Gertz reminisces about his
parents, his school days, and private life. He had a number of jobs
223. Id. at 242-44.
224. Id. at 244.
225. See opinion of Chief Justice Berger in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 355 (1974) where Gertz is characterized as "an advocate in the highest tradi-
tion of the law."
226. E. GERTz, To LIFE (1974) [hereinafter cited as To LIFE].
[Vol. 24:853
PATTERNS OF A LIFE IN LAW
before becoming a lawyer, including teacher, ghost writer and script
writer. His college experience, aside from the relationships he es-
tablished, was satisfying only for the literature and public speaking
classes. Much like the avocation of Edwards, reading was and re-
mains a particularly satisfying experience for Gertz: "To me books
were always as important as people. My life was highlighted by my
experiences with the printed word. 227  This may explain in part
Gertz' efforts in a series of books to give an account of his own life
experience so that others might share it through the printed word
just as he had shared others' lives. 228
Gertz traces his own interest in becoming a lawyer to his being
picked up by the police as a youth, held incommunicado, and ques-
tioned about the murder of Bobby Franks, the victim in the Loeb-
Leopold case. "I am sure, too, that, at least in part, I became a
lawyer, . . . because I wanted to make certain that fundamental
rights would be preserved for the people, and that I would have a
share in that great task. '2 29  Reports of the Sacco-Vanzetti murder
also caught young Gertz' imagination, and he identified with the
defendants.
The University of Chicago Law School provided Gertz a sound le-
gal education, and there he was exposed to a number of "the giants,"
including Ernst Freund. Freund, Frankfurter and Cardozo were his
early models. After law school, he joined a relatively small Chicago
firm, Epstein and Avery, with which he remained associated for four-
teen years.
From the beginning of his practice Gertz earned a comfortable
livelihood, but throughout his legal career he wanted more than
wealth; he wanted exciting and interesting cases.
Most of [American lawyers] had respectable practices and, unlike the De-
pression year, 1930, when I was admitted to the bar, they were beginning
to earn reasonably good livelihoods from relatives, friends, neighbors, and if
lucky, strangers. All these lawyers wanted to win their cases. I wanted
to have cases worth winning, cases with substance and meaning beyond fees
227. Id. at 29.
228. See, e.g., E. GERTz, A HANDFUL OF CLIENTS (1965) and E. GERTZ, MO-
MENT OF MADNESS: THE PEOPLE VS. JAcK RUBY (1968). Gertz has also written
books on literary persons such as Frank Harris and Carl Sandburg and on such con-
temporary problems as American ghettos.
229. To LIFE, supra note 226, at 34.
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earned. And I wanted to be a complete citizen, and a writer. I wanted
to be erudite without being dull. 230
In his professional life, Gertz has been active in professional and
civil organizations including the National Lawyers Guild, the Deca-
logue Society of Lawyers, the American Jewish Congress, the
Chicago Council against Racial and Religious Discrimination, the
Chicago Commission on Human Relations, and the Public Housing
Association. 231  He has played a role in the admission of black
lawyers to the Chicago Bar Association.282 Throughout his career,
Gertz has been put off by what he calls "the conservatism" of the
legal profession, and has tried to move professional associations
toward liberal positions and policies.
Gertz provides a survey of the exciting cases with which he has
been involved. More than the details of the cases, a sense of satis-
faction, is conveyed in this testimonial to a gratifying life lived in
law. His satisfaction has been heightened by the pleasures he ob-
tains from his lectureship at the John Marshall Law School. But it
is in practice that Gertz lives his life in law "using the law as an
instrumentality for something beyond personal satisfaction. I can
argue cases before reviewing tribunals and feel that I am among my
peers, reasoning with them, and teaching the truth, now and then,
to judges. 233 Much like John Marshall, Gertz shows no longing for
the past, indicates no desire to relive his life, reveals a satisfaction
with his career: "I know that today is the best that we have. I cher-
ish it. At the same time, there are definite plans that I have, as
well as timeless dreams. 23 4
CONCLUSION
The legal biographies reviewed in this Article provide an oppor-
tunity to observe the breadth and depth of motivations and satisfac-
tions of a life in law. Certainly family background and social stand-
ing can make the road to success less strenuous, as in the cases of
John Marshall and John W. Davis, but not always. The sense of
230. Id. at 73.
231. Id. at 93.
232. Id. at 81-82.
233. Id. at 249.
234. Id. at 251.
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strain continually felt by Charles Evans Hughes presents one ex-
ample of a professional life filled with constant tension. Even a
background of poverty and obscurity does not preclude prominence,
as exemplified by William 0. Douglas, nor prevent a satisfactory
career, as with George Edwards. A political commitment, as felt
by Marshall, a quest for respect and admiration, as demonstrated by
Hughes, a commitment to a social philosophy, as practiced by Ed-
wards, can provide alternative central motivations for a life's work.
For individuals such as Roscoe Pound and Ernst Freund, the law
provides a career of intellectual challenge and an opportunity for a
satisfaction in contributing to the development of a social force.
Some, such as John W. Davis, seek chiefly financial gain and fame;
others seek excitement and stimulation in their work, as does Elmer
Gertz. Some lawyers choose or are chosen to represent the inter-
ests of the powerful, wealthy or the state; other lawyers choose to
represent the poor, the common person, the interests of the com-
munity. All, however, seem to prize the degree to which they can
look back on a life in law without regret.
Legal biography is literature and one can find many well-written
works that provide an aesthetic experience. Biography and auto-
biography are also historical writings, and when they use primary
sources or personal recollections they can provide insights into the
past and explanations for the present. For the law-trained person,
the biographies and autobiographies of those involved in the law can
provide models, vicarious experiences, and lessons as well as ex-
amples of errors of judgment. The lives of judges, legal academics
and practicing lawyers provide examples of patterns of lives lived in
varying activities, using the legal training in common to all. More-
over, accounts and testimonials of those who have lived satisfying
lives in law can provide a sense of meaning for those who, caught
mid-career, find their life filled with professional demands, but no
promise of lasting significance. Most important, however, is the
opportunity to come to know others who have worked in law, their
problems, conflicts and satisfactions. By coming to know others
we may come to better know ourselves.
1975]
